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 This report presents the results of battlefield archaeology at the site of the Revolutionary 
War Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780, located in Kershaw County, South Carolina.  The 
analysis of historic documents, an intensive, controlled metal detector survey, and relic collector 
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CHAPTER 1:   





This report is presented by the 
South Carolina Institute of Archaeology 
and Anthropology (SCIAA) to the Pal-
metto Conservation Foundation (PCF) 
and the National Park Service-National 
Trust for Historic Preservation, Save 
America’s Treasures Initiative (SAT).  It 
details the results of an archaeological 
survey of the Camden Battlefield (Figure 
1.1, 1.2).  The purpose of this survey was 
to delineate battlefield features associated 
with the Revolutionary War Battle of 
Camden.  This report continues and 
builds on archeological research that be-
gan in 2001 with a comprehensive survey 
of artifact collections recovered by relic 
collectors since the 1970s (Legg, Smith, 
and Wilson 2005) and a strategic plan for 
preserving the battlefield (Fields, Smith, 
and Legg 2003).  Since these reports, a 
battlefield restoration program has com-
menced, and a professional archaeologi-
cal survey has been completed along with 
additional interviews with relic collectors.  
This report serves as a companion to the 
Legg, Smith, and Wilson report (2005). 
 
Specific Project Goals 
 
 For this particular project, the SCIAA was charged with the following project goals: 
 
1) Review and analyze the archaeological findings and features previously identified under 
American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) grant #GA-2255-03-015, which included a 
detailed analysis of twelve private collections and a metal detector survey completed in 2004.  
This work was detailed in Legg, Smith, and Wilson (2005). 
 
2) Prepare a Project Research Plan for approval by the PCF and SAT Initiative at the National 
Park Service. 
 
Figure 1.1 Location of Camden battlefield. 
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3) Based on Legg, Smith and Wil-
son (2005), conduct a GPS piece- 
plotted intensive metal detector sur-
vey within designated plots assessed 
as having the most potential for 
military artifacts and unmarked 
graves.  The designated plots survey 
was supposed to total at least six 
acres (2% coverage of 316 acres 
currently protected).  After analysis 
of the findings, the SCIAA was to 
assess the potential for finding arti-
facts in other areas, and recommend 
to PCF how and where ground 
penetrating radar surveys could be 
used to locate unmarked graves. 
 
4) Conduct ground penetrating radar 
survey in areas with best potential 
for unmarked graves. 
 
5) Recommend a plan to PCF for 
marking and preserving graves that 
complies with state and federal laws 
and preservation policies. 
 
6) Complete an archaeological sur-
vey report to include detailed base 
map data with GPS locations of all 
located cultural features in a GIS 
file, a master catalog of artifacts re-
covered during the survey, an analy-




The first known professional archaeological investigation of the Camden battlefield was 
attempted in 1998 when James Legg conducted a volunteer effort over two weeks to sample the 
site’s archaeological potential (Legg 2000).  The impetus for this work was the unexpected log-
ging of parts of the site and the immediate danger posed by unauthorized collecting.  The results 
of this work were incorporated into Legg, Smith, and Wilson (2005). 
 
 In 2001 and 2003 two grants were awarded to the SCIAA to conduct a survey of artifact 
collections in the hands of private collectors, and also conduct limited systematic metal detector 
sampling of selected battlefield areas (Legg, Smith, and Wilson 2005).  Both efforts were 
awarded by the PCF, and funded by the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP), of 
Figure 1.2 Camden battlefield depicting National Landmark 
Boundary, Easement, DAR property and modern topographic 
features. 
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the National Park Service.  The specific goals of the first project included:  1) assisting the PCF 
in reviewing information from collectors regarding artifact locations from previous metal de-
tecting to define the overall battlefield, core area, features, battle lines, and burial grounds; 2) 
assisting PCF in developing a GIS battlefield base map, using data gathered in Task 1; 3) in-
specting, identifying, and analyzing collectors’ artifacts; and, 4) making recommendations for 
future archaeological research and park interpretation.  A detailed battle history was necessary 
for site interpretation, and this was prepared as a 5th task.  The project’s first phase results were 
reported as part of a strategic plan for the preservation of the National Historic Landmark, Bat-
tle of Camden site (Fields, Smith, and Legg 2003).  Specific tasks for the second grant were to: 
1) continue analysis and interpretation of private collections obtained from the Camden battle 
site; 2)  advise the PCF in developing a plan for a two-foot interval topographic base map for 
the entire 1,300-acre Camden battlefield National Historic Landmark; 3) conduct a limited con-
trolled, GPS-plotted, metal detector sampling survey totaling three acres; and, 4) complete a 
report of findings to include survey results and analysis of seven private collections.  Given that 
it was necessary first to identify and then interview and arrange battlefield visits with collectors, 
it took three years (2002-2004) to complete the project with 12 collections inventoried.  Many 
site visits and interviews were conducted on weekends when collectors were available.  Like-
wise, the controlled metal detector survey was conducted intermittently over a two month pe-
riod in February and March 2004, when personnel were available. 
 
The 12 relic collections provided valuable information about the two armies’ locations 
at the beginning of the battle and intriguing data about how the battle may have unfolded.  Criti-
cally, the combined relic collection data confirmed the location of the front lines of both armies 
as had been hypothesized based on historical documents.  In addition, the data appeared to sup-
port the hypothesized retreat route of the 2nd Maryland Brigade and its subsequent destruction. 
 
The systematic metal detector surveys by archaeologists up to 2005 totaled approxi-
mately 35,000 square meters (8.64 acres).  Overall, the data from these surveys supported the 
conclusions drawn from the collector’s data.  Another goal of the metal detecting was to deter-
mine if sufficient material culture still existed for future interpretation.  The artifact recovery 
totals from the 1998 and 2004 metal detecting projects were modest, with the exception of the 
surprisingly productive Area 22 around the Camden monument.  A total of 235 battle related 
artifacts were recovered.  That same density of material extrapolated across the entire battlefield 
represented a significant material record of the Battle of Camden indicating that battlefield ar-
chaeology, in spite of heavy impacts from relic collecting, still had the potential to add to our 
knowledge and interpretation of the battle.  For this reason, the present project was designed to 
build on earlier work and to increase the area of coverage. 
 
The limited archaeological metal detecting survey was the only hard data available for 
battlefield ammunition distributions.  It was obvious that the previous research, in combination 
with the proposed work and relic collector data, would provide sufficient data to aid interpreta-
tion, and improve our understanding of the material used by British and American forces in 
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General Methods 
 
 The following general methods were used, discussed in order of the tasks noted above.  
Specific field methods for metal detecting are discussed in Chapter 4. The GPR and burial 
methods are discussed in a separate report (Smith, Legg, and Leader 2009). 
 
1) Review and analyze findings from previous archaeological investigations, including addi-
tional informant collections. 
 
The Principal Investigator and Project Archaeologist reviewed all previous archaeologi-
cal and collector survey data.  Five additional collectors known to have significant collections 
had not been available during the previous effort (Legg, Smith, and Wilson 2005).  Unfortu-
nately, of the five, only two collectors were interviewed and their collections added to the in-
ventory.  Two other collectors died during the course of the project.  The final known collector 
would not cooperate.  No other collectors have come forward and it is believed that, given the 
amount of public knowledge about the project within the collector ‘community,’ it is likely that 
those with sizable collections and who are willing to be interviewed already have come for-
ward.  The two collections that were inventoried are discussed in Chapter 3.  Both were large, 
early (1970s and 1980s), collections and their contributions to the data base were significant. 
 
2) Project Research Plan. 
 
The research plan was completed and provided to the Palmetto Conservation Foundation 
and Save America’s Treasures under separate cover. 
 
3)  Conduct a GPS piece plotted, intensive metal detector survey in survey blocks assessed as 
having the most potential for defining military artifact distributions and unmarked graves re-
maining on site. 
 
 As proposed, six new acres or 2% of the 316 protected battlefield acres were targeted 
during this survey.  The proposed six acres were selected from a total of 8.39 acres (Figure 1.3).  
The planned areas included ten 20 x 100 meter sample blocks totaling 20,000 square meters, 
and two larger areas totaling 8,000 square meters.  The difference between the minimal amount 
(six acres) and the proposed amount (8.39 acres) was due to the possibility that some planned 
acreage would be impossible to survey or unproductive due to surface and buried non battle re-
lated modern refuse that mask battle related artifacts  (this occurred during the 2003 survey in 
area 27, Figure 1.3).  The survey blocks were selected based on: 1) previous research and cover-
age; 2) information provided by private collectors; 3) a broad dispersal of the sampling areas so 
as to investigate selected portions of the entire battlefield; 4) hypothesized potential to add to 
our interpretation; and 5) landscape management decisions made by PCF.  The last criteria per-
tained to the large area between previously surveyed area 22 and 25 (Figure 1.3).  That area was 
in the process of being cleared of small brush and trees to enhance the battlefield interpretive 
program. 
 
 In fact, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, the fieldwork covered approximately 
seven of the 12 proposed areas, but the total area covered by the fieldwork was 460% larger 
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than the six acres planned (and 
budgeted).   This was due to 
controlled burning and other 
clearing activities by PCF that 
created ideal metal detecting 
conditions over large areas.  
Since our previous metal detect-
ing survey demonstrated signifi-
cant remaining battlefield arti-
facts, it was imperative that as 
much of this land be covered by 
professional survey as possible 
or it would have undergone un-
authorized collecting.  The exact 
areas and acreage covered by 
controlled metal detecting are 
discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
 The GPS piece plotted 
controlled metal detecting sur-
vey consisted of flagging a 
blocked area on the ground, 
walking adjacent transects while 
sweeping the ground with the 
metal detector and plotting finds 
with a GPS instrument.  The ex-
act methods are explained in 
Chapter 3. 
 
4, 5) Conduct ground penetrat-
ing radar (GPR) in areas with 
most potential for unmarked 
graves. Recommend a plan for 
marking and preserving graves that comply with state and federal laws and preservation poli-
cies. 
 
At least three different grave sites were known from collector interviews.  These loca-
tions were surveyed using GPR to see if the graves would actually be visible with GPR.  If so, it 
offered the potential to find other unknown graves that must have been dug shortly after the 
fighting.  The GPR survey was not successful.  However, we were able to locate two of the 
burials using trenching and conducted excavations to expose and confirm the burials.  The re-
sults of the GPR survey are presented as a separate report (Smith, Legg, and Leader 2009). 
 
6) Complete an archaeological survey report to include detailed base map data with GPS loca-
tions of all located cultural features in a GIS file, a master catalog of artifacts recovered, an 
analysis of survey findings, and recommendations for future projects. 
Figure 1.3  Location of proposed survey areas for SAT metal detec-
tor survey of the Camden battlefield. 
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 This report serves to meet goal 6.  Chapter 2 presents a history of the battle and is a re-
vised and slightly expanded version of the historic context (Chapter 2) in Legg, Smith and Wil-
son (2005).  Chapter 3 provides an update of the relic collector data with the new collector ma-
terials incorporated.  Chapter 4 presents the methodology and results of the archaeological sur-
vey to include survey coverage and artifact distribution maps.  During the course of the project, 
PCF was able to contract for a complete two foot contour map of the battlefield using photo-
grammetric methods from aerial photography and generate the map in AutoCad® software.  
Using this two foot contour map as a base, GPS data from all artifacts collected to date, from all 
previous work and the present survey, was projected onto a series of distribution maps based on 
artifact categories and types that have interpretive potential.  Chapter 5 interprets the battle from 
the combined archaeological and historical data and includes a series of maps depicting four 
battle phases. 
 
The Physical Setting of the Camden Battlefield  
 
 The Battle of Camden site is located eight miles north of modern Camden, South Caro-
lina, nearly a mile north of Gum Swamp Creek, on both sides of State Road 58 (Figures 1.1, 
1.2).   This project’s study area may be defined within three different boundaries (Figure 1.2).  
The smallest is a six-acre property formerly owned by the Daughters of the American Revolu-
tion (DAR) that includes a parking area, a monument to Baron de Kalb (Figure 1.4), a National 
Historic Landmark marker, and a South Carolina Highway Historic Marker.  Surrounding this is 
property owned by the Palmetto Conservation Foundation, with an easement owned by the 
Katawba Valley Land Trust.  The property encompasses what is believed to be the core of the 
battlefield.  This property and the DAR tract 
total about 316 acres.  The PCF  tract is in 
pine forest, much of it recently clear-cut and 
replanted.  Longleaf pine has been replanted 
as part of an effort to restore the landscape 
to its 1780 appearance.  Surrounding the 
PCF tract is a 1,229-acre area (inclusive) 
that defines the National Historic Landmark.  
This includes pine plantation, open pasture, 
private homes, a church, cemetery, commu-
nications tower, power line, and an unoccu-
pied building complex that formerly housed 
a county chain gang (Fields, Smith, and 
Legg 2003). 
 
 The local topography is critical to 
understanding the battle, as eyewitness ac-
counts (see history) describe terrain features 
that help locate participating units on the 
present landscape.  State Road 58, generally 
following the historic route used by both 
armies, bisects the battlefield.  Traces of the 
original road still exist about 10 yards east of 
Figure 1.4  DAR monument to Baron de Kalb erected 
in 1909.   
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the modern road, running through the DAR property to a point about 100 yards south.  The road 
traverses an upland area between drainages to the east and west that gently slope from north to 
south.  At the battlefield’s northern extent, the elevation is 402 msl, and it drops to 306 msl 
about a mile down slope, the approximate south end of the battlefield.  On the battlefield’s ex-
treme north end, the road crosses a narrow ridge, about 300 yards wide, but the terrain then 
opens to a plain some 1,600 yards wide just north of the de Kalb monument.  South of this 
broad plain, the landscape narrows again, constricted by swampy drainages on either side.  The 
width of the plain here is about 1,200 yards.  Traditionally, this is believed to be where the main 
battle lines were formed.  South of this point, the ridgeline falls gently into the Gum Swamp 
Creek floodplain. 
 
 The Camden battlefield is near the western edge of the Sandhills physiographic prov-
ince, and soils are primarily sand - Blanton, Lakeland, and Wagram types.  The historic ground 
cover was a longleaf pine-wiregrass association.  At the time of the battle, the old-growth long-
leaf pines were thick and tall, with the first limbs as much as 30 feet to 40 above the ground sur-
face. Wiregrass covered much of the otherwise open forest floor, and an eyewitness account 
claims that it was waist high in some places (see Chapter 2).  Today, the forest floor has an un-
derstory of young pines and blackjack oaks, and some sections exhibit thick growths of briars, 
hawthorn, sumac, wild raspberries, and strawberry bush.  The swamp areas are overgrown with 
fetter bush, holly, sheepkill, myrtle, swamp azalea, muscadine, and greenbrier (Mitchell 1989). 
 
The Battlefield Since 1780  
 
 The land use history of the Camden battlefield since 1780 is essential to understanding 
the archaeological resource today.   In 1786, a visitor reported that “shattered trees, and the un-
buried bones of men and horses” were still visible, but an 1830 visitor reported that not a ves-
tige of the battle remained (Whitfield 1980: 56).  Historian Benson Lossing examined the Cam-
den battlefield in January, 1849, and provided the first substantial description of the site: 
 
The hottest of the engagement occurred upon the hill, just before descending to 
Sander’s Creek [Gum Swamp Creek] from the north, now, as then, covered with 
an open forest of pine-trees. When I passed through it, the undergrowth had just 
burned, and the blackened trunks of the venerable pines, standing like the col-
umns of a vast temple, gave the whole scene a dreary, yet grand appearance.  
Many of the old trees yet bear marks of the battle, the scars of the bullets being 
made very distinct by large protuberances.  I was informed that many musket 
balls have been cut out of the trees; and I saw quite a number of trunks that had 
recently been hewn with axes for the purpose.  Some pines had been thus cut by 
searchers for bullets that must have been in the seed when the battle occurred.  
Within half a mile of Sanders Creek [Gum Swamp Creek], on the north side, are 
some old fields, dotted with shrub pines, where the hottest of the battle was 
fought. A large concavity near the road, filled with hawthorns, was pointed out to 
me as the spot where many of the dead were buried (Lossing 1855: 460). 
 
This suggests that parts of the battlefield’s southern end were already in fields in 1849, 
and the site of a mass grave was known.  The south end of the battlefield is actually nearly a 
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mile from Gum Swamp Creek, however.  Unfortunately the only map accompanying Lossing’s 
description is a version of the 1787 Faden Map (see Chapter 2). 
 
The Camden battlefield was still substantially wooded at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, but Camden historians Thomas Kirkland and Robert Kennedy reported that the charac-
ter of forest had changed: 
 
If one today, in leafy August, were to visit the scene of the battle, he would ex-
claim: “Here indeed was a veritable ‘war of the woods.’”  It has always been 
known locally as “Parker Old Field,” because of its ownership in former days by 
one Parker, although there are none of those badges in the vicinity always indica-
tive of old fields.  The present adjacent clearings are undoubtedly comparatively 
recent.  At the date of the battle the ground was occupied by a close array of tall 
and stately pines, limbless to a height of forty or fifty feet.   These, by the process 
of turpentining, have been reduced to a scanty few, so that not many of those re-
main that witnessed the battle.  Their thinning has allowed to come up a growth 
of scrub oaks, which in summer obscure the view much more than did the 
pines....  Those living in that neighborhood have found amongst the leaves of the 
woods many an old buckle, button, bayonet, bullet, cannon ball, flintlock, and to 
this day diligent search will reveal some such disjecta membra of the encounter 
(Kirkland and Kennedy 1905: 169). 
 
Kirkland and Kennedy found “grape shot and bullets in half-burnt and decayed 
trees” (Kirkland and Kennedy 1905:162n).  The map of the Camden battlefield prepared by 
Kirkland and Kennedy (1905:160) does not indicate which areas were wooded and which were 
cleared.  Their map does show the location of the “Pine where De Kalb lay wounded,” which 
was replaced by the monument to Baron de Kalb erected by the Hobkirk Hill Chapter of the 
Daughters of the American Revolution in 1909 (Whitfield 1980: 58-61). 
 
Whitfield (1980:59n) notes that a newspaper photograph of the battlefield taken around 
1910 “reveals that that there were a few clearings at the site,” and that a 1918 tourist guide re-
ported that it “is largely wooded ground.”   In March 1929, Lt. Col. H.L. Landers visited the 
battlefield while researching a history of the battle he prepared for the War Department 
(Landers 1929).  Landers’ battlefield map (1929:40) (see Figure 2.4) is essentially copied from 
that of Kirkland and Kennedy (1905:160), but it does show nearly all of the battlefield south of 
the present DAR property as no longer wooded in 1929.  Whitfield, however, indicates consid-
erably less clearing as late as 1941: 
 
During the 1920’s or early 1930’s a family named Hearon acquired a tract of 
land on the east side of Route 58, a few hundred yards south of the De Kalb 
marker.  Years later, J.W.Z. Hearon, who had helped to farm the land as a boy, 
recounted how he had collected buckets full of musket balls from the soil....  An 
Aerial photograph taken on January 29, 1941 shows a house, a barn, several 
smaller structures, and approximately 40 acres of cultivated land.  With the ex-
ception of a few scattered clearings, however, the rest of the battlefield remained 
woodland (Whitfield 1980:65n). 
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In 1930, the Hobkirk Hill Chapter of the DAR secured an option to buy 425.5 acres of 
the battlefield for about $6500.00, but the land was not purchased.  In 1942, the chapter did ac-
quire five additional acres around the de Kalb monument, adding to a single acre acquired in 
1912 (Whitfield 1980:64,65). 
 
An aerial photograph taken in 1949 (Figure 1.5) shows nearly all the battlefield south of 
the DAR property under cultivation, while north and west of the DAR property as woods or 
pine savannah.   By 1964 (Figure 1.6), the 1949 fields and the farm east of Route 58 are in pine 
plantation, while formerly wooded areas have been timbered, but are not agricultural fields.  
The DAR property stands out as a small rectangle of original (if thinned) longleaf pine forest.  
Figures 1.7, 1.8. 1.9 show the battlefield after a massive clear-cutting program completed in 
1998. 
 
 In summary, it is clear that the vegetation on the battlefield has gone through several 
changes since the battle, but the topography has remained the same.  Furthermore, relic collect-




The first known archaeological investigation of the Camden battlefield under the direc-
tion of professional archaeologists was attempted in 1998 when second author, James Legg 
Figure 1.5  Aerial photograph of Camden battlefield 
in 1949, DAR park in red (courtesy Thomas Cooper 
Library, USC).  
Figure 1.6  Aerial photograph of Camden battle-
field in 1964, DAR park in red (courtesy Thomas 
Cooper Library, USC). 
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conducted a volunteer effort over two weeks 
to sample the area’s archaeological potential.  
The impetus for this work was the unex-
pected logging of the site and the immediate 
danger posed by exposing the surface. 
 
The origin of the Camden Battlefield 
Collector Survey was in December 2000, 
when Legg (2000) was asked by the Pal-
metto Conservation Foundation (PCF) to 
assess the Camden battlefield’s archaeologi-
cal integrity and potential based on the 1998 
effort, and to suggest ways in which archae-
ology might assist battlefield interpretation.  
The battlefield was obviously undeveloped 
and relatively well preserved as a landscape, 
but as an archaeological resource it had suf-
fered serious damage through decades of 
relic collecting.  Among other recommenda-
tions, Legg suggested that a concerted effort 
be made to identify and interview individu-
als who collected artifacts in a pragmatic 
effort to salvage whatever information they 
could provide that might be helpful in inter-
pretation (Legg 2000).  This technique has 
proven very useful on intensely collected 
military sites that might otherwise yield far less information to archaeologists (e.g. Legg and 
Smith 1989; Legg and Espenshade 1991; Espenshade, et al 2001).   This recommendation re-
sulted in two grants and a report of findings (Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005). 
 
The current project began with the 
awarding of a contract from the Pal-
metto Conservation Foundation, 
through the National Park Service’s 
Save America’s Treasures Initiative 
(SAT).  The original award was in Au-
gust 2005.  Two extensions were 
granted as a result of various bureau-
cratic requirements, other contracts and 
grant schedules, seasonal field condi-
tions, and most importantly, progress 
made by PCF toward reconstructing 
the natural battlefield landscape.  Spe-
cifically, PCF planned a series of con-
trolled burns in 2007 to assist in the 
planting and growth of longleaf pine.  It 
Figure 1.7 Aerial photography of Camden battlefield 
in 1999 after clear-cut, DAR park in red (courtesy 
Thomas Cooper Library, USC. 
Figure 1.8 West side of Highway 58 at Camden battlefield 
after clear cut.  
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was obvious that a controlled burn 
would create excellent conditions for 
metal detecting and thus the archaeo-
logical expression of the battlefield 
would be in increased danger from un-
authorized collecting.  On the other 
hand, this was an unprecedented oppor-
tunity for archaeologists to obtain 
wide-scale distributional data through 
piece plotted metal detecting.  For both 
these reasons, the proposed fieldwork 
plan, including sampling areas, needed 
to be completely revised.  Essentially, 
we needed to cover as large an exposed 
area as possible.  For safety purposes, 
controlled burns must be conducted 
under strict weather conditions.  They 
needed to be scheduled during the winter, and within narrow wind and humidity parameters.  
Incidentally, South Carolina was experiencing a severe drought during the period, which in-
creased the risk of the controlled burning getting out of control.   Eventually, conditions for the 
controlled burn at Camden occurred in December 2006 and January 2007. 
 
Given the project’s nature, there was no single concentrated, continuous episode when 
project personnel were able to focus on the project’s goals.  Identifying, locating, visiting, and 
arranging battlefield visits between collectors and project personnel extended over a three year 
period (2005-2008) leading up to drafting this report.  Some site visits and interviews were con-
ducted on weekends when collectors were available.   Likewise, the controlled metal detector 
survey was conducted piece-meal over a period of two months in Spring of 2006, two weeks in 
June 2006, January and February 2007 and March 2007.  Collection analysis and artifact pho-
tography occurred as collections were made available to the project team.   The report was as-
sembled over two years with a final month-long effort in May 2008, with final revisions in No-
vember 2008. 
 
It is impossible to accurately assess the number of person-hours expended on this pro-
ject.  A total of 1,640 person hours were budgeted for this grant.  However, it is a reasonable 






Figure 1.9  Young forest east side of Highway 58 at Camden 
battlefield. 
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CHAPTER 2:  HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF CAMDEN, 





 The following battle history is a slightly revised version of the history first published in 
Legg, Smith and Wilson (2005).  As stated in the original, this history is in no way intended to 
be the last word concerning exactly what happened on that hot August 16th, 1780.  Instead, the 
history provides a basic understanding of the battle as it unfolded from the historic record, with 
a special emphasis on battle maneuvers that might be reflected in the archaeological record.  
Together, the ultimate goal of both the history and the archaeology is an attempt to detail, to the 
greatest extent possible, the sequence of maneuvers by American and British military units 
across the battlefield landscape.  With that in mind, this history relies primarily on eyewitness 
accounts, especially those of: 1) American commander General Horatio Gates, 2) Colonel Otho 
Williams, Gates’ Adjutant, 3) Major Thomas Pinckney, aide-de-camp to Gates, 4) Colonel 
Guilford Dudley, a private soldier at the time serving as an aide to Colonel Porterfield, 5) Brit-
ish commander Lord Earl Cornwallis; and, 6) Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, British 
cavalry commander.1  While there are many secondary accounts,2 after study, most seem to rely 
heavily on the few eyewitnesses referenced herein.  Therefore, unless they offer some addi-
tional insight or contrary interpretation of the sequence of events, or locate units on the battle-
field, they will rarely be referenced (except for their excellent summaries of the overall strategic 
situation).  As Battle of Camden Project research continues, eyewitness accounts, especially in 
pension applications are being compiled.  For that reason alone, this effort, cannot be the final 




 Only a few days after the fall of Charleston in May 1780, British infantry and cavalry 
detachments fanned out across South Carolina, capturing towns including Ninety Six, Camden, 
and Georgetown.  Controlling these towns created a defensive arc protecting Charleston, and 
outposts from which the backcountry could be subdued.  Both sides saw Camden, South Caro-
lina, as the keystone in this ring.  The only American forces in South Carolina were a few parti-
sans, and for a short time a party of Virginians under Colonel Abraham Buford who were to be 
slaughtered by British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton at the Waxhaws. 
 
Prior to Charleston’s surrender, General George Washington recommended that a force 
of Continental soldiers be sent south to rescue the besieged or, if Charleston had fallen, to act to 
“arrest the progress” of the British and “save the Carolinas.”3  He further hoped that the Conti-
nentals’ presence would rally the cause and increase Carolina militia and Continental enlist-
ments.  Major General Baron de Kalb, commander of the Maryland and Delaware Division, 
moved south and encamped near Buffalo Ford, North Carolina, on July 19th after a difficult 
march through Virginia and North Carolina.  There, de Kalb awaited further orders, desperately 
needed supplies, and reinforcements.  Despite de Kalb’s pleads to Whig authorities in North 
Carolina, he got nothing but promises.  Especially galling for de Kalb, and later Gates, was the 
lack of cooperation from Major General Richard Caswell who commanded North Carolina mili-
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tia, and who was supposed to join de Kalb with supplies.  Meanwhile, Congress sent General 
Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga, to take command of the Southern Army.  Gates arrived at 
the American camp on the evening of the July 24th, with the good news that a force of Virginia 
militia was on its way to join the Continentals.4 
 
At Buffalo Ford, Gates surveyed his army.  His best unit was de Kalb’s Maryland (and 
Delaware) Division, which consisted of two brigades.  General William Smallwood com-
manded the 1st Brigade; the 2nd was under General Mordecai Gist.5  The Delaware regiment, 
commanded by Colonel Joseph Vaughan, was an integral part of the 2nd Brigade.  In addition, 
Gates expected the legionary corps of Colonel Charles Armand, Marquis de la Rouerie, consist-
ing of about 60 cavalry and an equal number of infantry.  There were also three companies of 
Continental Artillery under Colonel Edward Carrington.  Major Thomas Pinckney, already in 
camp as an aide to de Kalb, became Gates’ aide.6 
 
Expecting to be joined by Virginia militia under Brigadier General Edward Stevens and 
North Carolina militia under Caswell, Gates decided to advance on Camden, because General 
Thomas Sumter reported it vulnerable due to a reduced garrison.  Gates made some hasty deci-
sions that, in hindsight, appear to have contributed to the disaster on August 16th, 1781.   To the 
amazement of his officers, Gates immediately ordered the weary and starved troops to be ready 
to march.  Three days later, the troops were on the move, leaving behind two artillery pieces for 
lack of horses.  The army would travel toward Camden with ten field pieces.  To the further 
consternation of some officers, Gates’ intended line of march was a direct route to Camden, 
through a part of the Carolinas widely known to lack forage--a veritable desert--occupied by an 
unfriendly population.  Colonel Otho Williams, Adjutant General, first to de Kalb, and then to 
Gates, attempted to dissuade Gates from this route in favor of a more indirect approach that first 
turned west, through Salisbury, North Carolina, and then south toward Camden.  Williams’ 
route would take the army across a landscape where the local population was friendly and for-
age more available.  Gates was not persuaded.7 
 
Thus the army marched through a desert-like countryside until they arrived at Mask’s 
Ferry on the Pee Dee.  Here the army found plentiful green corn and green peaches.8  Starving, 
the men ate the corn and peaches with predictable results.  As the men suffered gastrointestinal 
reactions, a tremendous thunderstorm hit the army and delayed the crossing. In the meantime, 
Gates made a more rudimentary tactical error.  Colonel Anthony White and Lieutenant William 
Washington, with what was left of the 1st and 3rd Light Dragoons, asked for aid in recruiting 
their corps and offered to join Gates’ army.  Gates turned them away.9  Although White and 
Washington’s commands were tiny and probably could not have prevented Tarleton’s cavalry 
from wreaking havoc at Camden, they would have been valuable for scouting and screening.  
Gates apparently placed little value on cavalry, and would later attempt to convert even Ar-
mand’s few cavalry horses to artillery draft horses. 
 
About this time, Gates was joined by Francis Marion with around 20 mounted militia.  
They had joined the southern command at Hillsborough, and de Kalb had dispatched them to 
Cole’s Bridge on the Pee Dee to gather intelligence and supplies.  Marion’s group would act as 
a bodyguard for Gates on the road to Camden.10   
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After some delay, Gates got his army across the Pee Dee on August 3rd to find Lieuten-
ant Colonel Charles Porterfield and about 100 Virginia State Troops awaiting him.  Porterfield 
was welcomed and his command began serving as scouts in front of the army.  As the army 
marched southwestward, Gates finally received two communications from Caswell.  Caswell 
first wrote Gates saying he was planning an attack on a British outpost, and then on August 6, 
came a plea for help as Caswell himself was about to be attacked.  Gates had had enough, and 
rode on ahead of the army to find the North Carolina militia and get them under control.  Once 
he found Caswell, Gates was “graciously” received and the two forces were joined on August 
7th.11  Together, with de Kalb on the right and Caswell on the left, the unified command 
marched to Lynches Creek.  There they found the British had abandoned camp and had moved 
to Little Lynches Creek.  Proceeding on to Little Lynches Creek, on August 10th, the Americans 
found British Lord Rawdon and his command fortified on the opposite bank. 
 
 While Gates’ starving army straggled toward Camden, British commander Lord Francis 
Rawdon, well aware of Gates’ progress, was attending to more pressing matters.  General Tho-
mas Sumter had been harassing the British outposts at Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock.  Raw-
don first marched out of Camden to reinforce these posts, but when he learned of Gates’ ap-
proach, he decided to concentrate his forces to meet the American army--first marching to 
Lynches Creek, and then, countermarching to Little Lynches Creek.  Thus, when Gates arrived 
on the west branch of Little Lynches Creek, about 14 miles from Camden, there was Rawdon, 
with the 23rd, 33rd and 71st Infantry Regiments, his own Volunteers of Ireland, a militia corps 
under Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, and 40 British Legion dragoons under Tarleton.  Farther 
west, British Legion infantry was posted at Rugeley’s Mills.12  Meanwhile, as Gates assessed 
his chances of successfully attacking Rawdon at Little Lynches Creek, Lord Earl Cornwallis 
left Charleston, rapidly heading northeast to take command of the British forces.13 
 
 Gates eventually thought better of attacking a fixed position across a causeway, despite 
de Kalb’s urging.  Instead, Gates marched north and then west to Rugeley’s Mills, effectively 
by-passing Rawdon and threatening British-occupied Camden.  The British Legion infantry left 
before Gates arrived.  Rugeley’s plantation, known as Clermont, was the home of loyalist Colo-
nel Henry Rugeley, and included mills, store, home, and barn.  At the fork of two creeks thir-
teen miles from Camden, Rugeley’s was along the main road from Camden to Charlotte.   As a 
result of Gates’ circling maneuver, Rawdon was flanked and moved back toward Camden, post-
ing his command at Logtown, a small hamlet one mile north of Camden.  This move placed 
Rawdon between Gates and Camden and better consolidated British forces.  Throughout the 
13th of August, units of Gates’ army stumbled into Rugeley’s Mills (Figure 2.1).  Late that 
night, Lord Cornwallis arrived at Logtown, unbeknownst to Gates.  The following day would 
find both Gates and Cornwallis making critical decisions leading to the Battle of Camden. 
 
Phase I:  Night March and Clash of Armies 
 
August 14th saw the long awaited arrival of General Edward Stevens and the Virginia 
militia who followed behind Gates, never being able to catch up.  Stevens brought some 700 
additional, albeit exhausted, reinforcements.  At the same time, Gates received a plea from Gen-
eral Sumter, operating to the west, for additional troops.  Sumter saw an opportunity to capture 
a British supply train proceeding toward Camden.  Rather than ordering Sumter to join the main 
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force for an attack against Corn-
wallis, on the morning of the 
15th, Gates sent Sumter 300 
North Carolina militia, 100 of 
the 5th Maryland Regiment’s 
Continentals, and two field 
pieces.14  Of less immediate con-
sequence, but fortunately for 
future American partisan opera-
tions, Gates detached Francis 
Marion and his men to the Wil-
liamsburg district to take com-
mand of the Williamsburg mili-
tia. 
 
 With amazing irony, 
Gates and Cornwallis both now 
decided that their individual tac-
tical situations were desperate 
and they needed to move imme-
diately.  For Gates’ part, he 
knew Rugeley’s was indefensi-
ble.  He needed to be closer to 
Camden.15  Thus, he sent Colo-
nel John Senf and Lieutenant 
Colonel Porterfield down the 
road toward Camden to find a 
better, more defensible site, 
from which to “confine his [the 
enemy] operations, to cut off his 
supplies…and…harass him.”16  
Senf found an “Advantageous 
Situation, with a Deep Creek in 
Front, Seven Miles from Cam-
den.”17 This site, probably Sand-
ers Creek, about a mile south of 
Gum Swamp, would become the destination of the American army’s march toward Camden 
that evening. 
 
Gates and his advisors were operating under a false assumption—that the British would 
remain on the defensive at Logtown.  Cornwallis, however, also saw his tactical, indeed strate-
gic position, as untenable.  From his perspective he had little choice but to attack.  The country-
side was in revolt, Sumter was on his flank, and sickness had spread widely in the British army.  
A retreat from Camden would have left the sick behind, along with a large quantity of supplies, 
and strategically would leave the upcountry to the rebels.  Cornwallis’ excellent intelligence 
informed him that Gates was “badly posted” at Rugeley’s.18  So with confidence that Charleston 
Figure 2.1  Detail of Kershaw District map showing locations of 
Camden, Rugeley’s, and the Camden battlefield (Mills’ Atlas 1825).   
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was well protected, and that he had “little to lose by a defeat, & much to gain by a Victory,”19  
Cornwallis prepared to march with the full intention of engaging and defeating Gates at Ruge-
ley’s. 
 
At the American camp, Gates called his officers to Rugeley’s barn the afternoon of the 
15th and issued orders to march south to the new position beginning at ten that evening.  Ac-
cording to Gates, he “communicated” his plans in this meeting and no one raised any objec-
tions.20  Otho Williams confirms that Gates heard no objections in the meeting, but asserts that 
there were misgivings among the officer corps about a composite army of regulars and militia 
that had never maneuvered together in daylight, marching at night toward a well-trained profes-
sional enemy.21  Otho Williams, in his narrative, has little good to say of Gates and takes every 
opportunity to point out poor decisions Gates made that led to the ultimate Camden disaster.  
Williams firmly believed that a few days rest at Rugeley’s would have seen the an outpouring 
of local militia and supplies.22   He was right, as Cornwallis noted the countryside was in arms 
against him.23  It is clear that the American army on the evening of the 15th was exhausted, 
sickly, and hungry.  However, unknown to Williams, Cornwallis was on the move, and would 
have arrived at Granny’s Quarters Creek the next morning, perhaps surprising and routing the 
American army at Rugeley’s.  With the advantage of 200 years hindsight, it now appears that 
there were two commanders making the best decisions possible in seemingly desperate situa-
tions. 
 
Gates’ army prepared for the night march.  He ordered the sick, heavy baggage, extra 
artillery stores, quartermaster supplies and those camp followers who had not already left, to 
move northeast to the Waxhaws.  In keeping with his intent of moving to a better position, other 
supplies such as ammunition would accompany the army.  Then he fed the men.  The combined 
effects of exhaustion and tight stomachs make it startling today to read that Gates issued the 
men a full meal of meat, bread, and a gill of molasses.  That was certainly a tactical error.  As 
should have been expected, the repast "operated so cathartically, as to disorder very many of the 
men, who were breaking ranks all night, and were certainly much debilitated before the action 
commenced in the morning."24 
 
 Gates’ army moved out at ten pm in the following order:  Armand's cavalry led the ad-
vance along the sandy road.  Two hundred yards on his right, marching through the woods in 
single file was Lieutenant Colonel Porterfield's Virginians acting as light infantry.  On the left 
at an equal distance was North Carolina militia light infantry under Major Armstrong.  Porter-
field and Armstrong were reinforced with hand picked men from the Virginia and North Caro-
lina militia, respectively.  On the road behind the cavalry were Armand’s light infantry fol-
lowed by an advanced guard, then the 1st Maryland Brigade, followed by the 2nd.  Next in line 
were three brigades of North Carolina militia followed by the Virginia militia, and a rear guard 
of volunteer cavalry covering the baggage and ammunition wagons. Each continental brigade 
had two field pieces at its front.25   The rest of the artillery was with the Virginia militia. 
 
In the van, Gates ordered his few cavalry to be prepared to stand and absorb any attack 
on their front.  Porterfield and Armstrong would then sweep in from the right and left to flank 
the attackers until more support could be brought up.  Gates thought the cavalry’s position in 
the van was a positive move.26 But Armand was upset with the order.    Armand complained 
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that cavalry had never been placed in 
advance of troops marching at night be-
fore, and that Gates’ order was insulting.  
It is possible Armand was right about 
the insult.  Gates did not seem to appre-
ciate the cavalry’s value, having already 
dismissed White and Washington, and 
he had wanted Armand's horses to pull 
the artillery.  Still, if Gates is guilty of 
misplacing cavalry out front, the British 
did the same.27 
 
 The landscape between Ruge-
ley's and Camden was gently rolling and 
wooded.  One eyewitness described it as 
"thick," however it is more likely that 
today it would be described as mature, 
since these woods in no way resembled 
modern forests of thin pines and heavy undergrowth.  The virgin pine forests of colonial South 
Carolina consisted of giant mature trees with thick trunks and a canopy beginning perhaps as 
much as thirty to forty feet above the ground.  In this environment, little underbrush could 
grow, so there were clear, open spaces between the trees that allowed good visibility and did 
not hinder maneuver.  Guilford Dudley, attached to Porterfield, described the battlefield land-
scape as an “open piney wood plains, destitute of brush wood” which did not hinder visibility, 
even at night.28  No other eyewitnesses mention any problem in maneuvering, nor did the woods 
hinder British cavalry during the battle (Figure 2.2).29 
 
 With a full moon shining through the high canopy, Armand's cavalry and Porterfield's 
light infantry kept visual contact throughout the march.30  The men were under orders not to 
make a sound.  But the thump of hooves on the sandy road, creak of leather, squeak of artillery 
wheels, and occasional cough probably carried farther than Gates would have wanted.  Still, at 
2:30 A.M., four and one half hours into the march and only two miles from his destination, 
Gates must have been gaining confidence that his maneuver would work.  He would reach 
Sanders Creek, send Armand across to scout, and deploy the army along the ridge above the 
creek.  He was probably no more than an hour or two from putting the British into a strategic 
squeeze that might have resulted in at least a temporary abandonment of the upcountry. 
 
Colonel Armand's vedette was 300 yards in front of the army, pushing down a long gen-
tle hill that would bottom out at Gum Creek.  Suddenly, out ahead there was a shout, and the 
vedette fired his pistol, the crack ringing through the night forest.  Armand hurried over to 
Porterfield on the right flank, and still maintaining silence, whispered “there is the enemy, Sir—
must I charge him?”31 
 
 Unknown to Gates, Cornwallis marched at the same hour, up the same road hoping to 
reach Rugeley’s Mills on the morning of the 16th for the surprise sunrise attack.  Lord Corn-
wallis placed a British Legion dragoon troop in the British van.  Behind them were mounted 
Figure 2.2  This pine/wiregrass landscape at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina, is reminiscent of the 1780 Camden battle-
field, except that the trees would have had greater diameters 
(courtesy Michael Stoner). 
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infantry and four companies of light infantry.  The 23rd and 33rd Regiments of Foot followed; 
behind them was Lord Rawdon's brigade consisting of the Volunteers of Ireland, British Legion 
infantry, and Hamilton's North Carolina Loyalists.  Two battalions of the 71st Regiment and a 
few wagons and dragoons brought up the rear.  Cornwallis also brought six field pieces, four 
with the forward elements and two with the reserve.32  The British march had also been silent, 
but when the two armies clashed, the British were probably in better order than the Americans.  
While crossing Sanders Creek, the British experienced some confusion.  But they quickly re-
formed and were in good compact order when they met Colonel Armand's cavalry. 
 
 The British cavalry charged immediately when their challenge went unanswered.33 Ar-
mand's command took the British charge and the two forces crashed together, pistols cracking 
and sabers clanging.  Porterfield's light infantry reacted to the first shots exactly as ordered and 
ran up the right flank, returning fire.34  This surprised the British dragoons and forced them 
back, but simultaneously, the British light infantry advanced, deployed, and laid down a solid 
fire, throwing back the American center.35  Armand’s cavalry recoiled, turned and retreated 
down the road, and most of the militia on both sides of the road followed, all crashing down on 
the American column, into the advanced guard and then the 1st Maryland Brigade.  Gates had 
ridden to the front at the first shots and was “urged to retire” by Armand,36 but he remained in 
front while other officers worked to get the troops under control and formed into a hasty battle 
line.  Out in front of the confused Americans, not all the militia left the field; some remained on 
either flank, held by their commanders and putting up a good fight.  Porterfield and about 50 
men on the right flank fired as many as five rounds before being forced back when the British 
moved up the road.  At this point, Porterfield was wounded and a retreat was ordered.37 
 
Covered by the British light infantry, the 23rd and 33rd deployed across the road.38  
Random firing continued for about 15 minutes, and then both sides ceased firing.39 It appears 
that both sides withdrew just beyond sight of each other, neither wishing to continue the battle 
in the dark.  But the night action was not over.  For the next two hours, British dragoons probed 
the forests, scouting the lay of the land and probing the American front.40  Likewise, the few 
American horsemen were busy, but not so venturesome.  Scattered fire by pickets continued 
throughout the night. 
 
 In the sharp night action, both sides took prisoners, and now as the armies prepared for 
battle, their commanders discovered who was in their front.  Gates unhappily learned, for the 
first time, that Cornwallis’ and his entire force was just down the gentle slope.  Cornwallis, 
probably much happier, learned he had Gates in the open and it would be nearly impossible for 
Gates to avoid battle.  The landscape gave neither side a particular advantage.  In open wood, 
both sides could deploy in linear battle order with their flanks protected.  On either side were 
low swamps and marshes, where cavalry and infantry would have difficulty out-flanking their 
opponents. Both sides anchored their flanks on these natural features.  Gates held higher 
ground.  Cornwallis had Gum Swamp to his rear.  This would seemingly give Gates some slight 
tactical advantage, but only if he forced Cornwallis to retreat.  Cornwallis initially had some 
concern about a road leading off to the west that might be used in an American flanking maneu-
ver, but after posting a guard there, he gave it no further consideration.41  While his men formed 
for battle, Gates called a council of war behind the line.  He asked his officers, “Gentlemen, 
what is best to be done?”  After a pause, General Stevens spoke.  “Gentlemen,” he said, “is it 
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not too late now to do any thing but fight?”42  It was a very good question.  With wagons block-
ing the road behind them, his troops formed into a ragged battle line that needed further atten-
tion, no cavalry to screen a retreat, and with daylight approaching rapidly, it would have been 
suicide for Gates to do anything but prepare to fight.43  No one commented further and Gates 
asked all to return to their units and await the daylight. 
 
 
 Perhaps here was where Gates made his greatest mistake.  When the troops were formed 
for battle, the militia displayed to the left and the Continentals to the right.  The newly arrived 
Virginia militia was on the far left. Thus the entire American left consisted of exhausted, sick, 
militia.44 Gates placed the 1st Maryland Brigade behind the 2nd Maryland Brigade and extending 
across the road.45  When morning came, the American lines stood in detail, as follows.  On the 
extreme right were the four regiments of the 2nd Maryland Brigade (with the Delawares near the 
road) totaling about 500 to 550 men.46  Under the command of General Gist, their right flank 
was anchored on a creek called Macdonald’s Branch.  In the center were the North Carolina mi-
litia under Caswell, approximately 1200 men in three brigades commanded by Gregory, Butler 
and Rutherford.  On the left, the Virginia militia consisted of about 700 men under Stevens.   
Stevens’ left flank was protected by a low swampy area, with Porterfield’s command and some 
North Carolina light infantry under Major Armstrong covering a small gap between the end of 
the line and the swamp (less than 400 men).  Further support came from Armand’s cavalry 
(around 100 men) behind the left flank.  As noted, two hundred yards to the center rear of the 
front line, straddling the road, was the 1st Maryland Brigade under General Smallwood 
(approximately 600). Artillery along the front line was arranged with two guns between the 
Marylanders and the Delawares, three straddling the road, and two in the rear line with 
Smallwood’s command (Figures 2.3 and 2.4).47 
 
 
Only a few hundred yards away,48 Cornwallis did not fully deploy his troops.  Instead he 
ordered his men to lay down where they were and await daylight.  With an army of regulars and 
well-drilled loyalists, he could leave most units in column along the road, knowing they would 
deploy quickly when the time came.49 
 
 
Phase II: Opening Gambits 
 
 Just before daylight, Gates rode down his front line and then the second line, saying a 
few words to the men, encouraging them for the coming battle.50  From Camden, came the 
boom of the morning gun.51  He had just finished speaking to Smallwood’s Brigade and had 
posted himself behind them when he heard his front line artillery fire.  Captain Singleton, in 
command of the artillery along the road, had spotted the British emerging in column from the 
gloomy morning mist about two hundred yards away.  He informed Colonel Williams.52  Wil-
liams immediately ordered him to fire and then spurred his horse back to General Gates.  Find-
ing Gates, he reported the British advance and added that the British were “displaying their col-
umn by the right.”53   According to Williams, Gates did nothing, so Williams offered a sugges-
tion that, if the British were displaying to the right, then an advance by the Virginia militia, al-
ready in line, might have a “fortunate effect.” Gates responded, “that’s right—let it be done,” 
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and Williams spurred his horse 
toward Stevens’ militia to re-
lay the order.  Gates then 
turned to Pinckney and sent 
him to order de Kalb to ad-
vance in concert with Ste-
vens.55  Gates also ordered the 
second line, Smallwood’s 1st 
Maryland Brigade, to move 
left and advance behind the 
Virginia militia.56  Williams 
soon reached Stevens and re-
layed Gates’ order.  Williams 
then made a request of Stevens 
that indicates excellent tactical 
understanding.  He asked for 
40 or 50 volunteers to run for-
ward, take to the trees, and 
start a “brisk fire,” enticing the 
British to return fire, and 
thereby blunting the effect of 
their first volley.57  The request 
was granted and the men ad-
vanced as close as 40 to 50 
yards from the enemy but it 
did little good against the on-
coming disciplined British 
who were now in line and ad-
vancing with bayonets.58 Ste-
vens, seeing the British ad-
vance, “put his men in mind of 
their bayonets,”59 which unfor-
tunately, had only been issued 
to them the day before. 
While Gates was parading in front of his troops, Lord Cornwallis was busy completing 
his deployment.  East of the road, he deployed a brigade under the command of Lt. Colonel 
Webster in the following order.  On his extreme right, he placed his four light infantry compa-
nies (148 men) anchored by the swamps on their right, then from right to left, the 23rd Regiment 
(292 men) and 33rd Regiment (238 men).  Behind them, the 1st Battalion, 71st (144 men) stood 
ready as a reserve.  Left of the road, Cornwallis deployed his other brigade under Lord Rawdon.  
From right to left, this brigade consisted of the Volunteers of Ireland (303 men), the British Le-
gion infantry (126 men), and Colonel Hamilton’s North Carolina Loyalists anchored by another 
swamp on the left (267 men).  More volunteer militia (322 men) formed behind Hamilton.60  
Cornwallis’ artillery, consisting of two, six pounders and two, three pounders, as placed on the 
right of the Volunteers of Ireland in the road.  The 2nd Battalion, 71st (110 men) was placed be-
Figure 2.3  Detail of William Faden map of Camden battlefield, ca. 
1787 (modified from American Map Company Inc., No. 2113).  The 
map appears in Tarleton (1787) and Stedman (1794).  Note Saunders 
Creek should be Gum Swamp Creek. 
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hind the Volunteers, each 71st battalion had a six pounder artillery piece.  The British Legion 
dragoons under Tarleton (182 men) formed a reserve along the road.61  With a few pioneers and 
artillerists (28 and 19 men, respectively), Cornwallis’ force consisted of 2,179 officers and 
men.62  This disposition placed Cornwallis’ best, the light infantry, 23rd and 33rd Regiments, 
against Gates’ weakest units, the Virginia and North Carolina militia. 
 
 Cornwallis had just completed his deployment and was ready to advance when, “I per-
ceived that the Enemy, . . . were formed in two lines opposite & near to us, and observing a 
movement on their left, which I supposed to be with an intention to make some alteration in 
their order, I directed Lt. Colonel Webster to begin the attack.”63  Cornwallis may have been 
informed of the American movement by Captain Charles Campbell who led a Highland light 
infantry company on the extreme British right.  Campbell had stationed himself on an old stump 
and when he noticed the Americans move is reported to have said “I’ll see you damned first,” 
and ordered his men forward.64 
 
Like most battles, the sequence of combat events quickly becomes confused.  The fol-
lowing is offered as a possible reconstruction of the battle’s first few minutes.  At dawn, Corn-
wallis ordered his forces to deploy.  As daylight broke, Williams and Singleton saw the British 
maneuver and Singleton opened fire with his artillery.  At least part of the British right line was 
still in column at that point.65  Williams raced back to Gates while the British rushed to com-
plete their eastward deployment; their light infantry skirmishing in front covered the deploy-
Figure 2.4  Map of Camden battlefield and deployment of American and British units at beginning of battle 
from Landers (1929) and based on Kirkland and Kennedy (1905).   
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ment of the 23rd and 33rd. Gates and Williams met and after Williams told Gates that the British 
were in column, Gates ordered Stevens to advance.  Williams then rode to Stevens to relay the 
order.  As artillery and light infantry fire spread, Williams and Steven conferred.  Williams at 
that point realized that it was too late to gain any advantage by attacking the deploying British. 
Instead, he quickly rounded up a few volunteers and moved out in front of Stevens’ line to at-
tempt to dull the impending British attack. Cornwallis noticed Williams’ volunteers moving 
forward, which he took as an attempt to change formation, and ordered the British advance to 
begin, first Webster then Rawdon.66   By then, de Kalb had his orders and also started forward.  
In that instant, the British were advancing on their right against the militia, and the American 
right and British left were advancing toward each other.  Stevens, on the American left, soon 
realized that his Virginia militia would not gain any advantage by advancing and prepared the 
militia line to hold against the on-coming British, reminding the men that they too had bayo-
nets.  But it would do no good.67 
 
Phase III:  Flight of the Militia and Advance of the Continentals 
 
 All eyewitnesses agree that the militia broke immediately.  Many, probably most, fled 
without firing a shot.68  Seeing the British bayonets and hearing their cheers, the tired, untried 
militiamen, “at least two thirds” of the army, turned and ran.69  The Virginians fled first, 
“almost instantly followed by the North Carolinians.”70  One North Carolinian, Garret Watts, 
unashamedly claims to have been the first to fire, and flee: 
 
I can state on oath that I believe my gun was the first gun fired, notwith-
standing the orders, for we were close to the enemy, who appeared to maneuver 
in contempt of us, and I fired without thinking except that I might prevent the 
man opposite from killing me.  The discharge and loud roar soon became gen-
eral from one end of the line to the other.  Amongst other things, I confess I was 
amongst the first that fled. The cause of that I cannot tell, except that everyone I 
saw was about to do the same.  It was instantaneous.71 
 
 Watts is probably referring to being the first of the North Carolinians to fire and run, not 
the first in the whole of Gates’ force.  Obviously, if Williams did get a few volunteers out in 
front of the Virginia line, they fired first, and quite possibly fled first.  In this scenario, the skir-
mishers may have precipitated the collapse of the Virginia line by running back to, and through, 
the main line instead of falling back slowly. 
 
 In any case, it would appear that the flight of the militia was like a line of dominos, with 
the far left collapsing first, following through the Virginians and then along the North Carolina 
line.  Most were gone in an instant, but not all. Just to the left of the 2nd Maryland Brigade, 
Dixon’s North Carolina regiment (consisting of both militia and Continentals) held firm, firing 
as many as three volleys, before they left the battle.72  Or perhaps they did not run until the very 
end.  Pinckney, returning after delivering Gates’ order to de Kalb, saw these brave few standing 
firm but “in small squads in the rear of the left of the artillerists.”73  Guildford Dudley testifies 
that Dixon’s men not only stood firm, but actually drove the enemy opposite them (the 33rd) 
“out of line.”74  This is supported by other sources, including reports that the American center 
advanced with the right.75  Furthermore, Sergeant Lamb of the British 23rd Regiment recorded 
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that the men under Gregory “kept the field while they had cartridge to fire.  Gregory himself 
was twice wounded by a bayonet in bringing off his men.”76  Thus, it is clear that the extreme 
right of the North Carolina line held for quite sometime, perhaps as long as the American right. 
 
In the short time it took Pinckney to ride to de Kalb, witness the commencement of their 
advance, and return, the Virginians and most of the North Carolinians were fleeing northward 
toward Rugeley’s.  The 1st Maryland Brigade, ordered forward to support the militia, must not 
have gotten far to the left before the militia collapsed back into them.   The Marylanders opened 
ranks to allow the militia through, reformed and checked the British advance.  Colonel Guilford 
Dudley saw them take post on Dixon’s left, which means they advanced near or along the first 
line or that the front line was forced back into them.77  As the Marylanders engaged the British 
23rd Regiment and light infantry, Pinckney rejoined them only to be wounded.  He was carried 
to an ammunition wagon that was “then endeavoring to escape, into which I was thrown.”78 
 
Before being wounded, Pinckney’s goal was to rejoin Gates, but Gates was not with the 
1st Maryland Brigade.  Gates, Caswell and other officers were quite busy attempting to rally the 
militia.  Twice, according to Gates, he and Caswell attempted to stop the militia, but to no avail.  
Pressed by the British, the mass of humanity “ran like a Torrent” up the road toward Ruge-
ley’s.79  Gates was swept along with the flood.  Guilford Dudley, making his way along the 
American line, saw the militia run and asked an officer in Caswell’s command where Gates 
was.  The officer replied that “He’s gone,” and showing contempt for his general added, “He 
has fled and is probably past Rugeley’s by now.”80 
 
Dudley, with the help of several North Carolina militia officers, attempted to stop the 
flood.  Amazingly, they managed to get about 150 men to face about in line, only to discover 
that none had weapons.81  They quickly melted away.  In their panic, the militia not only fled up  
to Rugeley’s, but others “kept straight forward through the plain and over the sand hills, to gain 
the Cheraw road on their right.”82 
 
 
Phase IV:  Destruction of the Continentals 
 
 As the militia collapsed on the left, and Smallwood’s Brigade was holding back the Brit-
ish 23rd and light infantry, Gist’s brigade on the American right was in a furious battle with the 
British loyalists and unaware of the danger from the British right flank.83  Advancing against 
the British Legion, North Carolina Loyalists and Volunteers of Ireland, the American right 
pushed the British back, capturing some British and an artillery piece.  One eyewitness states 
that even Lord Rawdon was a prisoner for a moment; another source states that the American 
right gave three cheers for victory.84 
 
Essentially, the Americans on the right were winning their half of the field.  But what 
exactly happened along that portion of the line probably will never be known.  Few Continen-
tals have told their side of the story, and as the battle raged, smoke hung over the battlefield, 
obscuring observation by either side.85  According to Guilford Dudley, when Smallwood’s re-
serve brigade took post to the left of Dixon’s regiment, “the contest was renewed with redou-
bled vigor, the American right led on by the brave De Kalb.”86  Even the self-confident Tarleton 
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admits that de Kalb, “made a vigorous charge with a regiment of continental infantry through 
the left division of the British.”87    Furthermore, he noted that the 33rd Regiment took “heavy 
and well-directed fire” along with the British left, indicating that Dixon men were doing their 
part.88  The battle was fierce, in some instances hand-to-hand, and for a moment, the British left 
was in trouble. 
 
 For perhaps as long as thirty minutes, the contest remained in the balance on the western 
half of the battlefield.89  The 2nd Maryland Brigade increased its pressure against the British left.  
Although bending, and even giving ground, the British provincials would ultimately hold.  
Meanwhile on the eastern side, when the militia fled north, the disciplined British did not fol-
low them.  Instead, the British far right turned on the left (eastern) flank of the 1st Maryland Bri-
gade. The 1st Maryland Brigade had no choice but to give ground.  As the 23rd and the Light 
Infantry continued to press the Marylanders’ exposed left wing, officers of the 1st Maryland Bri-
gade sought out General Smallwood for orders to retreat.  But Smallwood had left the field.  
Undaunted, they rallied the brigade, only to be forced back again.  Again they rallied and again 
were driven back under pressure from the British right.  The British 33rd Regiment took a tre-
mendous fire as its left pivoted against Dixon’s North Carolina militia.90   Yet, eventually, the 
1st Maryland Brigade was almost at a right angle with the American right, and as a result of be-
ing slowly pushed back, perhaps as much as a two hundred yard gap opened between the 
American left and right flanks.  Williams rode to the 2nd Maryland Brigade, only to find them 
fully engaged and about to break.  He called to them to stand, but Lieutenant Colonel Ford of 
the 6th Maryland Regiment answered, “They have done all that can be expected of them—we 
are outnumbered and outflanked—see the enemy charge with bayonets.”91 
 
 It is at this point that the Americans paid for Gates disdain of cavalry.  Cornwallis, see-
ing the gap between the Maryland brigades, ordered his front line to open their ranks.  Then he 
threw forward his reserves, and most critically, ordered the cavalry into action.92   A detachment 
of British cavalry under Major Hanger attacked the left flank of the 1st Maryland Brigade.93  
The rest, under Tarleton, “completed their confusion.”  Exactly what Tarleton means by this is 
not known.94 Although most sources say the British cavalry attacked the American left flank, 
(meaning that they attacked the 1st Maryland brigade), either Hanger or Tarleton probably ex-
ploited the gap between the 1st and 2nd Maryland Brigades, turning right and left, and getting 
behind both.95  In the process, they also captured the American artillery.  Behind them came the 
71st Regiment, filling the gap between the British 33rd and 23rd Regiments.  The 1st Maryland 
Brigade was being pressed on both flanks and its rear. 
 
Phase V:  Rout of the Americans 
 
 With cavalry in their rear, and the 71st Regiment thrown into the British line, the Ameri-
cans began to loose cohesion.   Many Continentals fought on and were slaughtered.  One Suth-
erland Highlander, who is said to have killed as many as seven Americans, ended the battle 
with his bayonet “twisted like a corkscrew.”96 Some Continentals were able to surrender, while 
still others broke into small clusters and attempted to fight their way out.  Williams claims that 
“not even a company retired in any order,” giving the false impression that the Continentals ran 
like the militia.97 In making such a statement, he must be speaking only of the battlefield itself, 
otherwise, he contradicts himself by observing that Major Anderson, “rallied, as he retreated, a 
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few men of different companies; and whose prudence and firmness afforded protection to those 
who joined his party on the rout.”98  Williams also recorded that along the line of retreat the 
Continentals reformed and made their way to safety in little groups.  “Colonel Gunby, Lieuten-
ant Colonel Howard, Captain Kirkwood, and Captain Dobson, with a few other officers, and 
fifty or sixty men, formed a junction on the rout, and proceeded together.”  All these officers 
were in the 2nd Maryland Brigade. 
 
There is good evidence that even on the battlefield, Continental units did not completely 
dissolve but, again, broke into small groups, some attempting to surrender and others fighting 
their way out. Tarleton recorded that General Gist retired into the swamp with about 100 Conti-
nentals “in a body….in a compact state.”99  This group waded into the swamps on the American 
right where the British cavalry could not follow.  A few weeks after the battle, American militia 
Colonel John Banister wrote to a Colonel Bland, that some of the Marylanders actually broke 
through the British. 
 
 Instead of all the Maryland line being killed and taken, near five hundred 
are come in, with most of the officers, particularly Smallwood, Cist [sic] and 
Gunby, who were said to have been slain.  This veteran corps, after having sus-
tained the attack of the enemy, with the assistance of only one regiment of North 
Carolina Militia, by a bold and well conducted attack on the enemy forced a 
passage through their main body and retreated.  On their retreat they totally de-
molished a party of horse sent to harass them, except two only that escaped by 
flight.100 
 
If this is Gist’s command, it appears that Tarleton underestimated the number that got out 
through the swamp.  If not, it means that separate groups of Americans fought their way off the 
battlefield as isolated, semi-cohesive forces. 
 
Perhaps another final stand was made by the remnants of the 1st and 2nd Maryland Bri-
gade on the north ridge (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.5).  Once the battle was won and the Continen-
tals killed, captured, or pushed into the swamps, the British cavalry was ordered north after the 
fleeing Americans.  They did so with their usual vigor. 
 
There is an eyewitness account that the Baron de Kalb was one of the final casualties of 
the conflict.  A North Carolina militiaman stated in his memoir that after he had surrendered, he 
witnessed the General’s final moments.  De Kalb, on horseback was riding along the line when 
intercepted by a British officer, who demanded de Kalb’s sword in surrender.  De Kalb suppos-
edly spoke French to the officer, apparently wanting assurances that the man was an officer—a 
proper individual to accept his surrender.  The British officer again demanded his sword, and de 
Kalb for some reason decided to ride on.  The British ranks then fired volleys by platoons and 
hit de Kalb several times.  Stood against a wagon, or placed on an tree stump depending on 
sources, de Kalb was dying when Cornwallis rode up and seeing him said “I am sorry, sir, to 
see you, not sorry that you are vanquished, but sorry to see your so badly wounded.”101  De 
Kalb was taken to Camden and died three days later. 
 
 Gates, Caswell, and Armand, forced off the battlefield by fleeing militia and pursuing 
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British cavalry, continued to Rugeley’s attempting to stop the flood.  However, “the militia 
were struck with a panic and obeyed no more command.”102  At Rugeley’s, Gates with the assis-
tance of Colonel Armand and his cavalry, again attempted to rally the militia.  There they found 
another problem.  The wagon train that had been ordered north before the march to Camden had 
not gotten far.  As Gates, Armand, and other American officers attempted to send them off, and 
rally the militia streaming by, Tarleton’s cavalry appeared across the creek.  Fortunately for the 
Americans, the British cavalry were widely dispersed.  Tarleton had to assemble his dragoons 
before mounting any attack toward Rugeley’s.  The respite for the Americans was temporary, 
Tarleton quickly recalled his troopers and pushed across the creek.  “Colonel Armand’s dra-
goons and militia displayed a good countenance, but were soon borne down by the rapid charge 
of the legion; The chase again commenced. . .”103  Tarleton pursued the militia some twenty-two 
miles up the road to Hanging Rock where he halted.  Along the way his command captured one 
hundred and fifty wagons104 and many American officers and men, including North Carolina 
militia under General Rutherford. 
 
 General Gates, was not one of them.  Seeing that it was impossible to rally the militia, 
hearing no more firing in the direction of Camden, and being hard pressed by British cavalry, 
Gates and Caswell rapidly proceeded up the road to Charlotte.  Once in Charlotte, he decided to 
ride on to Hillsborough to report the defeat, leaving Caswell at Charlotte to wait for stragglers 
to come in.105  Gates’ flight, covering 180 miles in three and one-half days, did nothing for his 
reputation; Alexander Hamilton quipping, “It does admirable credit to the activity of the man at 
his time of life.  But it disgraces the general and the soldier.”106 
 
 North Carolina militia melted into the countryside to make their respective ways home.  
Some Virginia militia eventually reassembled at Hillsborough, but were soon released as their 
time of service was complete.  The Continentals likewise made their way to Charlotte, then 
Salisbury and Hillsborough.  Many Continentals would show up in the next few weeks and with 
each returning soldier, the enormity of the catastrophe lessened.  On August 24th, Francis 
Marion surprised a guard of British soldiers escorting 147 Continental prisoners of war from 
Camden to Charleston.  Amazingly, close to half refused to be rescued, instead wanting to con-
tinue to Charleston under British escort.  Of the other half, three joined Marion, 57 made it to 
Wilmington, the others probably deserted.  Marion’s British prisoners were sent to Wilming-
ton.107 
 
Casualty figures for the Camden battle will never be exactly known.  Cornwallis re-
ported 800 to 900 Americans killed and around 1,000 prisoners captured—but Landers states 
that this is “so far from correct that they are valueless as a guide.  The militia broke early in the 
day and scattered in so many directions upon their retreat that very few were made prison-
ers.”108  That is probably right.  Cornwallis’s official return of prisoners lists only 603 privates 
and 92 officers, non-commissioned officers and musicians, plus another eight staff officers.109  
Only 38 privates from the Virginia militia were captured, many probably simply went home.110  
On July 19th, a return of Steven’s Virginians listed as 1,081 fit for duty, but after the battle, on 
August 29th, only 351 remained fit for duty, with 483 listed as deserted.111 There were 124 
North Carolina privates listed as prisoners. 
 
Among the Continentals, we have already noted that an unknown number made it back 
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to the American lines, either Charlotte or Hillsborough.  Landers reports the loss of the 
“regulars” at about 300, a seemingly very low figure.  Williams states that 832 failed to answer 
muster.112  Cornwallis lists 441 Continental privates captured.   Gates wrote from Hillsborough, 
North Carolina, on August 29th, that as many as 700 of the Maryland Division rejoined the 
Army.113 Indeed, Smallwood’s return of July 22, lists 1,071 “fit for action” and 1,744 in total, 
and by September 23rd, he had reconstituted the Maryland/Delaware Division with 860 fit for 
duty, and 1,157 in total.114   
 
Meanwhile the wounded had little chance.  Only 240 were carried from the field of bat-
tle to Camden.115  Among the most critical American losses were the Continental officers and 
noncommissioned officers, including General de Kalb.  Around 32 Continental officers were 
taken prisoner including Lt. Colonel Porterfield, who died of his wounds, and Thomas Pinck-
ney, who survived. 
 
On the British side, it is clear that, although the British won a resounding victory, they 
paid for it. Cornwallis’ casualty figures indicate that he had 68 killed, 245 wounded, and 11 
missing.  The 33rd and Volunteers of Ireland took much of the American fire.  The Volunteers 
of Ireland suffered a 28% casualty rate (87 of 303), and the 33rd fared even worse.  The 33rd had 
only 238 effectives, and 100 were casualties, a casualty rate of 42%.116  That was a tremendous 
blow, and they were all veterans who would be difficult to replace.  The British would enjoy 
similar one-sided victories in the days to come, but their ranks would continue to thin. 
 
For the time being, while many who escaped would later reform in Hillsborough, the 
battle was a costly defeat for the Americans.  For the next few months, there was no American 
Southern Army.  Cornwallis can be excused for feeling confident that South Carolina was won 
and that he could move against Charlotte.  He was mistaken; Camden was not a fatal blow to 
the American cause.  It must have been exasperating for the British that the victory did not at all 
translate into a subdued South Carolina.  Only a day after Camden, on August 17th, the Ameri-
cans won a small victory at Musgrove’s Mill.  Soon Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter—the 
latter barely surviving a costly defeat at Fishing Creek — began a partisan campaign against the 
British.  Then, on October 7th, Major Patrick Ferguson was surrounded on Kings Mountain and 
Cornwallis was forced back into South Carolina.  On November 20th, Sumter checked Tarleton 
at Blackstocks.  By December, Gates had been replaced by General Nathanael Greene.  The 





After Camden, Gates career was ruined.  In Hillsborough, North Carolina, Gates at-
tempted to reconstruct the army, writing letters to Congress in an attempt to gain supplies and 
men.  Throughout the fall, he made some progress.  On November 25th, Gates Southern Army 
had reconstituted itself into a force of 1,704 men fit for duty in Providence, North Carolina, but 
that increased to 2,604 when counting sick, furloughed, and detached.117  He understood that his 
time was short.  North Carolina Governor Abner Nash wrote Congress to remove him and his 
fellow officers lost confidence in him.  While Congress replaced him with Nathanael Greene, a 
congressional committee exonerated his conduct.  Overall, historians would be harder than his 
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contemporaries.  Perhaps his successor should have the last word on Gates’ performance.  In 
January 1781, Greene wrote Alexander Hamilton: 
 
The battle of Camden here is represented widely different from what it is 
to the Northward.  Col Williams thinks that none of the General Officers were 
entitled to any extraordinary merit.  The action was short and succeeded by a 
flight wherein every body took care of themselves as well Officers and soldiers. . 
. .The Col also says that General Gates would have shared little more disgrace 
than is the common lot of the unfortunate notwithstanding he was early off, if he 
had only halted at the Waxhaws or Charlotte”118 
 
 
Later, in October 1781, Greene would personally write Gates that: 
 
I had the opportunity of viewing the ground where you fought, as well as 
the disposition and Order of Battle, from all which I was more fully confirmed 
in my former sentiments, that you were unfortunate, but not blameable; and I 
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 This chapter is an update of the Camden Battlefield Collector Survey discussion origi-
nally presented in the 2005 report but incorporates two new collections.   While the primary fo-
cus of this project was a controlled metal detector survey, the Collector Survey continued, and 
yielded important new information.   Two additional, and especially significant, collections 
were documented during this project, bringing the total to 14 collections.  As a result, the Col-
lector Survey distribution maps published in 2005 have been revised accordingly, and projected 
onto the two-foot contour map.  The collector data continues to be a critical component in the 
effort to understand the Battle of Camden. 
 
 The Camden Battlefield Collector Survey was designed to salvage artifact information 
that had already been removed from the Camden battlefield to assist battle interpretations.   
While the battlefield was undeveloped and relatively well preserved as a landscape, as an ar-
chaeological resource it had suffered serious damage through decades of relic collecting with 
metal detectors and earlier as a result of artifact pickup.  This resulted in the removal of most 
battle related artifacts.  To help mitigate that loss, the Collector Survey entailed a concerted, 
long-term effort to identify and interview individuals who collected artifacts from the site in a 
pragmatic effort to salvage whatever information they could provide (Legg 2000; Fields, Smith 
and Legg 2003; Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005).  The hope was that this information would pro-
vide a mapped record of artifact distributions that might tie the Battle of Camden, as understood 
from the historical record, to the present landscape.  A second goal was to document a large 
sample of the material assemblage used by the opposing armies in 1780.  This technique has 
proven useful on heavily collected military sites that might otherwise have yielded far less in-
formation to archaeologists (e.g. Legg and Smith 1989; Legg and Espenshade 1991; Espen-
shade et al 2001).1    A final goal was to locate any unmarked burials.  The results of this effort 
are discussed in a separate report. 
 
Methods and Results  
 
 The methods employed for the Collector Survey remain essentially unchanged from the 
initial effort (Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005:47-60).  Data collection procedures have been sim-
ple and informal, involving on-site visits, phone conversations, and e-mail.  It was intended that 
the following tasks be undertaken for each informant: 
 
1. A meeting on the site, with a walking discussion/interview regarding the collector’s finds 
 and impressions, and his collecting history. 
2. Recording on a standard base map of the “find spots” of as many particular, described arti
 facts as possible, together with any general observations. 
3. Examination of the collection, if available, and photographic documentation of selected artif
 acts. 
 
 As might be expected, the quality of data recorded varies considerably.  No collector 
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provided specific proveniences for ammunition specimens, but other battle artifacts of any sort 
(e.g. buttons, musket parts) were relatively rare finds, and consequently, their provenience was 
memorable.  In most cases, informants were able to map most individual finds other than lead 
shot.  The confidence with which artifacts were plotted varied.  On the poor end of the scale, the 
location of an artifact might consist of simply a wave of a hand in the direction of a clump of 
trees – perhaps a 20-meter margin of error.  Much of this uncertainty is the result of the clear-
cutting of large portions of the battlefield in 1998, which eliminated the visual frame of refer-
ence over large areas (Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005:12).  Two collectors used GPS instruments 
to record their finds, which they cataloged, photographed, and presented on CD ROM (e.g. 
Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005:50).  Other collectors had previously mapped finds on their own 
sketch maps, and this information was transferred to the base map.  Even the most general 
“plots” of individual items were recorded as points, and all such proveniences were considered 
adequate for the overall, large-scale distributional information that was sought.2 
 
 All data, from generalized ammunition distribution maps to precise GPS locations was 
transferred onto U.S.G.S. topographic maps; through 2005, the USGS Camden North quad map 
was used.  For this project, we used the much more detailed two-foot contour map.  Each plot-
ted artifact was described in an accompanying catalog.  The catalog system is common to both 
the Collector Survey and the archaeological metal detector survey effort detailed in Chapter 4.3  
Appendix I lists the collection code numbers assigned to date.  Each artifact is also assigned a 
functional class code, including: 
 
S:   Lead shot - musket balls, buckshot, and intermediate shot for pistols, rifles, etc. 
A:  Arms and accoutrement parts – gun parts, gun tools, bayonets, scabbard and cartridge box 
hardware, etc. 
C:  Clothing objects – military and civilian buttons, knee buckles, shoe buckles, neck stock 
buckles. 
G:  Iron and lead case shot balls. 
M:  Miscellaneous objects that may or may not be battle artifacts, but which plausibly date to 
the 18th century – eating utensils, wrought iron hardware, iron frame buckles, etc. 
N:  Misc. objects that are clearly not battle artifacts, but were nevertheless recorded in a private 
collection or collected during the metal detector survey (e.g., an 1829 dime). 
 
 By far the most common artifact recovered by all collectors was lead shot, chiefly mus-
ket balls, and buckshot from musket buck and ball cartridges.  These mundane projectiles were 
ubiquitous, and as a result none of the collectors recorded to date maintained specific location 
information for particular ammunition specimens.  More than 2,600 musket balls and buckshot 
were collected by the informants, but their provenience is remembered only in very general 
terms.  Two collectors had bagged most of their lead shot by various described proveniences 
(e.g. “west of highway, head of ravine”), but the remainder combined their shot in a single col-
lection covering the entire battlefield.  Three of the latter collectors did maintain sketch maps 
that indicated quantities of lead shot recovered from different parts of the battlefield, but these 
notations were not linked to particular specimens.  The collector ammunition data is rough and 
incomplete.  Nevertheless, data from the five collections about which something particular is 
known, together with observations from several collectors concerning lead shot distribution, 
was combined to prepare a generalized lead shot density map (Legg, Smith and Wilson 
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2005:54), which is substantially revised for this report (Figure 3.1).  This distribution necessar-
ily combines fired and unfired shot of all calibers, but it includes no areas that were dominated 
by unfired ammunition, which would indicate a camp or other non-combat episode.  In the pri-
vate collections as well as in the metal detector survey (Chapter 4), the ratio of fired to unfired 
balls is nearly three to one. 
 
 The collector data was first applied to a series of GIS map layers that illustrate the plot-
ted finds in each collection.   The most useful product of the Collector Survey is the next step – 
maps showing finds, by functional class, of all collections combined.   Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 
3.5 illustrate revised versions of the results of plotting arms and accoutrement artifacts, clothing 
artifacts, and artillery case shot balls from all 14 private collections.  These are the three mean-
ingful categories of plotted artifacts in terms of overlaying the Battle of Camden on the present 
site.  Combined with the admittedly less precise data on the ammunition density map (Figure 
3.1), and correlated with the metal detector survey (Chapter 4), this information has proved ex-
tremely valuable in reconstructing the battle (see Chapter 5). 
 
 An important limitation in the 2005 Collector Survey was the failure to locate any infor-
mant who intensively collected the site prior to 1980, when “Anonymous Collector 
#1” (Collection 01) first visited the battlefield.  He recalled even then battlefield showed the 
tell-tale signs of heavy collecting – small excavations, discarded non-battle artifacts on the 
ground surface, and a scarcity of “easy” artifact readings.   In 2006, the authors were introduced 
to two individuals responsible for at least some of that earlier collecting.  These informants, 
both of whom preferred to remain anonymous, began collecting the Camden Battlefield in 1972 
(#16) and 1974 (#17) (Figures 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9).   Their early information has provided a 
clearer picture of the original artifact distribution densities.  Both collectors had read the 2005 
report, and both agreed with that battle interpretation.  They reported that two areas evidenced 
particularly heavy musket fire when metal detected in the 1970’s; these included what we con-
sidered the Continental right, or western flank, where it was anchored on a swampy drainage, 
and a strip along the east side of Highway 58, running southeast from the DAR property for 
some 500 meters.  The area that might have connected these two concentrations, from Highway 
58 west to the Continental right, was then heavily overgrown in a field of young planted pines – 
it was this area that several later collectors (#’s 1, 2, 3 and 4) considered the scene of the heavi-
est action.  This agrees remarkably well with both the battlefield interpretation presented in the 
2005 report and the general distribution of battle artifacts recovered during our formal metal 




 The original Collector Survey indicated an interpretation of the battlefield that the au-
thors believed was essentially correct.  Newly recorded collections (#’s 16 and 17) and our own 
extensive metal detecting project (Chapter 4) have confirmed and refined our original interpre-
tation of the battlefield (Chapter 5).  We can reiterate that the outermost density boundary de-
picted on Figure 3.1 encompasses the area of significant action during the Battle of Camden 
proper.  A substantial minority of the battlefield was thus located outside of the original PCF 
property, to the north and northwest, a deficit has been substantially answered by the recent 
tract purchase by PCF. 











Figure 3.1  Generalized distribution of lead shot, revised. 
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Figure 3.2  Collector survey distribution of arms and accoutrement artifacts, revised. 
Collector Survey distribu-
tion of arms and accoutre-
ment artifacts, revised. 
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Figure 3.3 Collector survey distribution of clothing artifacts, revised. 
Collector survey distribu-
tion of clothing artifacts. 
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Figure 3.4  Collector survey distribution of iron case shot balls, revised. 
Collector survey distri-
bution of iron case shot 
balls, revised. 
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Figure 3.5  Collector survey distribution maps 3.1 through 3.4 combined. 
Collector Survey:  all classes combined. Collector survey, all artifacts combined 
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Figure 3.6  Lead shot from Collection # 16. Top left—unfired musket balls, top 
right—fired musket balls, bottom—buckshot. 
Figure 3.7  Iron case shot balls from Collection # 17. 
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Figure 3.8  American musket turn screws from Collection # 17. 
Figure 3.9 Knee buckles from Collection # 17. 
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Endnotes 
 
1It is worth reiterating an important point about this subject made in the 2005 report: most archaeologists still ap-
pear to have a poor understanding of the scope and time depth of metal detecting on military sites.  Questions such 
as, “Has this battlefield been metal detected?” or, “Will our work encourage metal detecting pot hunters?” might 
have been pertinent 35 or 40 years ago; they are naive today. With rare exceptions, all reasonably accessible battle-
fields, field fortifications and campsites in North America and the UK have been collected for several decades by 
many different individuals, and nearly all such sites have lost most of their “detectable” metallic artifacts.  This 
condition extends to even the most obscure skirmishes and bivouacs, thanks to the rigorous historical research con-
ducted by thousands of collectors. The exceptions are those few sites or portions of sites that have both legal pro-
tection and 24-hour security, and sites where the use of metal detectors is not practical (e.g. developed areas, filled 
areas or trash dumps).  While the literature of archaeological metal detecting on military sites is growing, most 
reports of such work fail to address or even mention the “missing collections” that were removed years or decades 
before any archaeological effort was undertaken.  It is not surprising, then, that few archaeologists have recognized 
the collector community as a resource that can and should be carefully tapped for information.  A remarkable over-
view of battlefield relic collecting as it was in its heyday can be found in Stephen Sylvia and Michael O’Donnell, A 
History of American Civil War Relics (Orange, Virginia: Moss Pulications,1979). 
2There was considerable variation among the interviews and the results, largely dictated by the kinds of informa-
tion offered by the informant.   In any case, all collectors recorded to date have shown great enthusiasm for both 
the battlefield preservation project and the archaeological project, in spite of the fact that the public effort has put 
an end to artifact digging on site.  Only two collectors who were contacted ultimately did not follow through with 
formal recording.  Four collectors (#’s 1, 2, 16 and 17) insisted on anonymity, but were otherwise entirely forth-
coming, and two of them (#’s 1 and 2) donated their entire, intact collections to the project.  In contrast, at least one 
of the large collections previously documented has since been sold and dispersed.  
3The first two-digit element in the catalog code indicates a discrete collection (an individual collector, a bounded 
metal detector sample area, etc.).  The second, three digit element indicates a provenience within the collection (an 
artifact findspot, or a described general provenience), while the last, three digit element indicates  artifacts within 
the provenience. 
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CHAPTER 4.   THE METAL DETECTOR SURVEY 




 The primary focus of this project has been an intensive, controlled metal detecting effort 
over as much of the battlefield as possible.  The original management recommendations pro-
vided to PCF in 2000 suggested that “A 100%, piece-plotted metal detector collection should be 
made over the entire easement tract,” in order to secure whatever artifact data remained before 
it, too, was removed by collectors (Legg 2000).  A small sample (8,100 square meters) (two 
acres) was formally collected in 1998.  The results suggested that a useful level of data was still 
present (Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005:75-80,83-85).  The 2001-2005 Camden Battlefield re-
search conducted under the ABPP grants concentrated on the Collector Survey program, but 
included a fairly substantial metal detecting component as well (Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005).  
That work involved thorough metal detector coverage of some 26,900 square meters (6.24 
acres), considerably more than the promised 16,000 square meters (four acres), but still a minor 
sample of the entire battlefield.  The combined 1998-2005 coverage of 35,000 square meters 
(8.64 acres) was still too small a sample, especially for providing information about specific 
battle episodes.  The ABPP projects were intended, however, as something of a feasibility test 
rather than a sample sufficient to aid in interpretation.  The results of these previous efforts indi-
cated that a large-scale metal detector collection would indeed yield important interpretive data, 
and to that end the present work was undertaken.1 
 
 This project, funded as a SAT Camden Battlefield project, proposed coverage of at least 
an additional six acres (24,281 square meters).  In the event, we covered 24 acres or 97,124 
square meters.  Combined coverage for all archaeological metal detecting within mapped areas 
is now 32 acres (129,499 square meters). 
 
 In addition we also covered 9,479 meters of firebreaks during this project.  At a conser-
vative estimate, all firebreaks were over two meters wide, except firebreak 41 within the DAR 
park, which was approximately a meter wide.  However, assuming a two meter width (most 
were wider than two meters), estimated firebreak coverage included at least another 18,000 
square meters.  Total combined survey zones and firebreak coverage of the battlefield is now at 
148,457 square meters (36.68 acres). This was substantially more than proposed, however, the 
controlled burns (see below) offered an unprecedented opportunity and we felt it imperative that 
to cover as much ground as possible.  Overall, this is still a small portion of the battlefield, but 
we believe it sufficient to substantially define and characterize the battle on the present land-




 As in the case of the ABPP metal detector project, the SAT coverage was originally in-
tended to consist of standard (20x100 meter) sample areas widely distributed over the property 
(Figure 1.3).  Like the previous project, we quickly abandoned the projected distribution of 
standard sample areas, and for the same reason - concurrent with the archaeological field work, 
PCF was engaged in landscape management and restoration activities.  These tasks included 
The Archaeology of the Camden Battlefield        50 
hand-thinning of trees and brush, bush-hogging, mowing, cutting firebreaks, and controlled 
burning, all activities which created ideal metal detecting conditions, but which also exposed 
the same areas to unauthorized collecting.  There was ultimately far more area “exposed” than 
we could cover.  Choice of collection areas was often reactive.  That is, coverage was added in 
a question-oriented fashion (e.g., “Does this artifact concentration continue to the south and 
east?”).  In addition to area coverage, we detected firebreaks cut by PCF to contain controlled 
burns.  It will be seen below that, in spite of the non stratified nature of our coverage, we man-
aged to “box in” the primary concentration of battle material with areas of much lower density.  
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate area coverage and firebreak coverage, with provenience numbers.  
Appendix I provides a description of each provenience number.  There was no minimum or 
maximum extent for either areas or firebreaks, but we regularly broke them up into new prove-
nience numbers for convenience of reference.  The collection areas were bounded as needed 
with flagging tape or pin flags, and were numbered in the same provenience sequence as earlier 
Camden collections.  Numbers 21-37, 49-59, 70-72, and 74-78 were assigned to collection ar-
eas, while various segments of firebreaks were assigned numbers 38-48, 73 and 75.  (Some 
numbers were either not used or used to catalog artifacts recovered outside of a formal collec-
tion area, see Appendix 1). 
 
 Metal detector coverage within each area was intended to be total-100% of the block 
(Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7).  Often we not only covered an area once, completely, but cov-
ered them again at transects perpendicular to the first transects.  There was no sampling within 
areas – within the flagged bounds of a given area, our intent was to recover all battle artifacts 
present.  Sampling an area (e.g., detecting only every third lane, or alternate lanes) was not con-
sidered.  These approaches, used by other archaeologists (Fox 1993:67), we feel only add un-
necessary complexity to the fieldwork, and leave behind artifacts that might provide significant 
information.  This latter consideration is particularly important on a heavily collected site like 
Camden, where only a thin remnant of the original material remains.  Obviously, despite com-
plete coverage, we can not claim that we have recovered every artifact within a given area.  The 
degree of metal detector “recovery” is a subjective measure, dependant on many variables in-
cluding the kinds of artifacts present, soil conditions, ground cover, the detectors used, and, 
most importantly, the relative experience of the operators.  In this case, we sought to be as thor-
ough as possible, and it can at least be said that it would have been difficult to find additional 
battle artifacts in any area we completed.  Changed conditions, however (e.g. additional clear-
ing of vegetation, or stripping of the humus), would probably yield another round of artifacts. 
 
 All metal detector readings were investigated, with the exception of diagnostic alumi-
num readings and very small iron readings, both of which were typically indicated by the detec-
tors employed.  Readings were excavated by the detector operator at the time of discovery.  
This is by far the most efficient recovery method, as only the operator can readily find the ob-
ject, and it avoids cluttering the sample area with flags that mark, as often as not, unwanted 
trash.  With exceptions such as nineteenth century coins and “M” class artifacts (below), non-
battle artifacts were not collected.  The retention of material such as shotgun shells, modern bul-
lets, pull tabs, etc. would have doubled the size of our collection, and added nothing to our un-
derstanding of the battle.  Artifacts to be retained were placed in zip lock bags marked with the 
sample area number and the sequentially assigned artifact number within the sample.  The bags 
were collected and replaced with survey pin flags bearing the same number.   After detecting in 
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Figure 4.1  Search area locations and numbers.  For reference, Area 22 is the DAR park. 
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Figure 4.2  Firebreak locations and numbers.  For reference, north firebreak 41 is within the DAR 
park. 
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a sample area was completed, the area 
bounds and artifact pin flags were mapped 
using a GPS instrument (Figure 4.5), ulti-
mately resulting in the GIS artifact distri-
bution maps in Figures 4.8 to 4.23.  The 
pin flags were not removed until the GPS 
data was successfully downloaded and 
inventoried. 
 
 The primary metal detectors used 
for the SAT metal detector project were a 
Fisher 1270®, and a Tesoro Cibola®. 
Both devices were late-model detectors 
with excellent depth capability, detecting 
buckshot to a depth of about 9,” and mus-
ket balls to more than 12.”  Our volunteers 
used a variety of detector brands and mod-




 Artifacts were returned to SCIAA for processing and analysis.  Iron objects were 
washed with a toothbrush, sketched and described, and consigned to a base water solution to 
await conservation.  Lead and lead alloy objects were washed, soaked briefly in a weak lye so-
lution to remove soil staining, washed again, and dried.  Copper alloy objects were simply 
washed and dried.  Pewter objects were rinsed and painted with a dilute white glue solution un-
til they were no longer friable.  Dried artifacts were placed in fresh, archival zip lock bags 
marked with the catalog number.  The catalog system is the same three-part code used for previ-
ous Camden battlefield work, and the functional class codes are also common to both projects 
(Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005: Appendix A).  The first element in the catalog number is the 
collection (e.g. Area #34), the second part 
is the provenience within the collection 
(e.g., GPS artifact location #15), and the 
final number enumerates multiple objects, 
if any, within the provenience.  The arti-
facts themselves are not marked with cata-
log numbers.   In processing, a number of 
artifacts were identified as modern, most of 
them alloy buckshot.  These items were dis-
carded, and their numbers left vacant. 
 
 A total of 36 iron objects recovered 
during the SAT metal detecting have been 
conserved or are still in the conservation 
process, including all iron items that are 
certain battle artifacts.  For most items this 
Figure 4.3  Metal detecting on east side of highway, Areas 
30, 31, prior to controlled burn. 
Figure 4.4 Metal detecting in Area 74 after bush hog-
ging. 
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involved thorough reduction in elec-
trolysis alternating with manual 
cleaning, followed by distilled water 
baths, boiling in distilled water, bak-
ing, and sealing with microcrystal-
line wax.  A few fragile items lack-
ing solid iron cores have been treated 
with baths and boiling in distilled 
water, baking, and sealing. 
 
 Information recorded in 
analysis varied depending on the sort 
of artifact under examination.  The 
great majority of artifacts were lead 
shot, which are discussed in greater 
detail below.  Iron case shot balls 
were both measured for diameter and 
weighed.  Other kinds of artifacts 
were described as appropriate, including material, construction, condition, and any available 
historical or typological nomenclature, and usually at least one representative metric measure-
ment. 
 
 Lead Shot Analysis 
 
 The overwhelming majority of battle artifacts consisted of fired and unfired spherical 
lead shot.   These comprise an ammunition collection that may seem quite generic in terms of 
its interpretive value.2 In fact, a careful and informed analysis can derive a great deal of infor-
mation from such a collection.  The immediate results of such an analysis are the individual am-
munition descriptions found in the 
descriptive catalogs (Appendix II on 
CD).  This data was, in turn, grouped 
into a number of significant subsets, 
and these were mapped onto the new 
two foot contour topographic base 
map of the Camden battlefield 
(below, Figures 4.11-4.23). 
 
 The most significant diagnos-
tic characteristic of an excavated lead 
shot is its size.  The diameter of the 
ball, either measured directly or pro-
jected, provides a fair idea of the 
caliber of the weapon for which it 
was made.  The correct usages of the 
firearms terms “caliber” and 
“diameter” are rarely encountered in 
Figure 4.5  Recording artifact location using GPS instrument, 
Area 20. 
Figure 4.6 Archaeologist pointing to musket ball in situ, Area 35. 
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archaeological literature, but they are 
essential in any discussion of ammu-
nition.  “Caliber” refers to the diame-
ter of the bore of a weapon, while the 
“diameter” of a projectile is its actual 
diameter (both expressed in hun-
dredths of an inch).  In muzzle-
loading weapons, the diameter of a 
projectile is smaller than the caliber, 
while in breechloading weapons the 
projectile is usually slightly larger.  
Thus, for example, a .75 caliber mus-
ket ball for a British .75 caliber mus-
ket is typically about .685” or .690” in 
diameter.  The difference between a 
muzzle-loading weapon’s caliber and 
its diameter is its windage.  In the 18th 
century, caliber was most often ex-
pressed using a cumbersome system of so many balls to the English pound (or the French livre), 
such that an “11 bore” gun had a caliber so that 11 balls of proper diameter weighed one pound 
(Hamilton 1976:125). 
 
 Unfired lead shot in the SAT collection were measured directly with calipers, to within 
thousandths of an inch.  Special cases complicated this procedure.  Some balls were cast in 
crudely cut molds, and were not nearly spherical – these specimens were described as such, 
with a range of representative measurements.  Even well made balls were not measured on the 
mold seam, as the mold halves were seldom exactly aligned.  Other cases noted in analysis were 
examples that were heavily corroded or exfoliated, and have thus lost diameter.  All unfired 
shot were also weighed, and projected diameters (below) were calculated. 
 
 Fired balls are almost always somewhat distorted, if not completely mangled, and their 
diameters must be projected from their weights.  Sivilich (1996) provides a reliable formula for 
converting the weight of specimens in grams to their diameters as spheres in hundredths of an 
inch (in the catalog these are the “p.d.” values).  Special considerations here were any factors 
that may cause the ball to be underweight for its intended diameter – whittling, pig or rodent 
gnawing, melting, tearing, severe corrosion, etc.  Pewter balls weigh much less than lead balls 
of the same diameter and the Sivilich formula cannot be applied to them.  Fortunately pewter 
balls are almost absent from the Camden collections, and in any case they have a distinctive 
gray, friable surface very unlike lead. 
 
 Other diagnostic details were noted in the analysis of fired shot. Often preserved on the 
surface of a fired ball are indications of loading and firing, although any or all of these marks 
were subject to being erased by the impact of the ball.  Smoothbore muskets and carbines were 
equipped with steel ramrods, which sometimes imparted a distinct concave or flat dent on the 
ball.  These weapons were normally loaded with paper cartridges, however, and the balls were 
thus protected from ramrod dents.  When fired, a smoothbore ball with normal windage (e.g., 
Figure 4.7 Close-up of British musket side plate in situ, Area 
59. 
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a .640” ball in a .69 caliber bore) bounced and scuffed its way up the barrel, and was typically 
scarred with one or more cylindrical scrape marks from contact with the bore.   Musket balls 
fired in buck and ball loads sometimes show small dents from the buckshot; the buckshot from 
these loads often show dents or facets from the other buck shot as well as the musket ball, in 
addition to bore marks.  Rifles were loaded without a cartridge, with a tight-fitting ball with lit-
tle or no windage.  To ensure that the ball engaged the rifling thoroughly, it was usually 
patched.  This involved placing the ball on a small, round patch of linen at the muzzle, such that 
the ball was completely enveloped in the patch when it was rammed. The loading and firing of 
a patched rifle ball imparted a series of evenly spaced, fabric weave impressions around the cir-
cumference of the ball, each corresponding to one of the lands of the rifling.  Balls fired in unri-
fled “rifles” were usually patched, and may also show traces of weave.  Un-patched rifle balls 
show scrapes or flats corresponding to the lands.  The evidence for rifling and patching is often 
faint, and sometimes obliterated by impact. The fired ball must be examined under magnifica-
tion, and a typical “confirmation” consists of one or two faint traces of fabric weave somewhere 
on the non-impact surface. 
 
 The impact surface of a fired ball records an impression of the material that it struck, 
and this detail, where discerned, was noted in analysis.  The two most common and most read-
ily identified impressions are wood and soil – most Camden specimens struck one or both  sur-
faces. Wood impact surfaces usually have plain impressions of splintered wood grain.  Soil im-
pacts typically impart a mass of abrasions radiating away from the leading face of the ball at 
impact, and the impact face often retains grains of sand embedded in the lead.  A few Camden 
balls exhibited fabric weave on its impact face – an impression imparted not by patching, but as 
the result of striking a cloth surface, perhaps the victim’s clothing. 
 
 Several other diagnostic characteristics were recorded as seen. Lead shot were often 
made more uniform after casting by a process of tumbling or rolling.  This involved placing a 
large quantity of new balls in a keg or bag, which was then rolled or agitated for an extended 
period.  This smoothed the various surface irregularities, including the sprue mark and the mold 
seam, and imparted a finely dimpled surface comprised of tiny dents.  Regular British musket 
balls are usually rolled, often so thoroughly that the mold seam cannot be detected (e.g. Legg, 
Smith and Wilson 2005:100).  It may be that .75 caliber musket balls that are not rolled are not 
British.  Rolling is often detectable on fired as well as unfired balls. 
 
 Unfired balls that were discarded or lost with their paper cartridges intact often exhibit a 
black crust or stain remaining from the powder charge.  In some cases the mark is a well-
defined, round patch where the bottom of the ball rested on the charge, while more typically the 
mark is less regular, reflecting the rapid deterioration of the paper cartridge (e.g. Legg, Smith 
and Wilson 2005:Figure 6.4B).  Some powder marks are readily washed away in processing, 
leaving only a localized corroded area on the surface of the ball. 
 
 Lead shot may exhibit a wide variety of damage, both deliberate and incidental, inflicted 
both before and after deposition.  Deliberate mutilation can include whittling and/or battering, 
either to no particular end, or to create a useful object. Balls originally embedded in trees are 
sometimes deeply slashed by axe or saw, and balls from former or current plowed fields often 
exhibit cuts and scrapes from plows, hoes, or discs.  At Camden, a number of balls were recov-
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ered that were deeply abraded by sand and gravel; these were found in or near the original road 
bed, and represent shot exposed to road traffic for many years.  One of the most common muti-
lations is chewing, either by hogs or rodents.  Lead shot that have been chewed (and digested) 
by pigs usually retain their full weight, but have the appearance of used chewing gum.  Exam-
ples that have been chewed by rodents exhibit patches of very fine tooth striations where the 
animal has actually consumed a portion of the ball - these balls can be substantially under-
weight.  Finally, some balls are no longer even recognizable as such, particularly those that 
have melted, typically in campfires or forest fires.  Finds of heavily patinated melted lead were 




 Figures 4.8 through 4.23 present the essential results of the SAT metal detecting project, 
combined with data from the more modest 1998 and ABPP efforts.  The intensive analysis of 
the material (above) allowed us to group the artifacts into a number of subsets, which were then 
mapped individually and in certain combinations.  The expectation, of course, was that mean-
ingful patterns might emerge in certain subsets that are not apparent in the overall distribution 
of battle artifacts (Figure 4.23). The artifact distributions were combined with the historical in-
formation (Chapter 2) and the Collector Survey information (Chapter 3) to yield the interpreta-
tions presented in Chapter 5.  Below, the rationale and definitions for the various artifact sub-
sets are discussed.  
 
 Figure 4.8: Distribution of clothing artifacts  
 
 This figure shows the distribution of all clothing class artifacts (buttons, buckles) which 
are certain or probable battle artifacts.  These 13 artifacts were too few to suggest any meaning-
ful patterns by themselves, but their distribution essentially matches the overall battle artifact 
cluster (Figure 4.23).  The clothing artifacts are individually numbered and identified on Figure 
4.8. 
 
 Figure 4.9: Distribution of arms-related artifacts  
 
 This figure shows the distribution of all small arms and arms accoutrement artifacts 
other than ammunition, including objects such as gun parts, scabbard hardware, musket tools, 
and cartridge box hardware.  Like the clothing artifacts, these 29 items were too few to suggest 
patterns, but they did agree with the overall artifact distribution.  The arms artifacts are a di-
verse group, and they are individually identified with Figure 4.9. 
 
 Figure 4.10: Distribution of artillery artifacts 
 
 This figure shows the distribution artillery-related artifacts, including 10 iron case shot, 
one lead case shot, and one iron wire handle that is thought to be from a case shot.  While the 
artillery sample is small, the distribution agrees well with the Collector Survey artillery data 
(Figure 3.4).  There is much potentially significant variation among the iron case shot, and they 
are individually numbered and identified in Figure 4.10.  One Collector Survey case shot is in-


















   Figure 4.8: Clothing Artifacts 
 
   1.  22 006 001:  Button, tombac. 
   2.  22 062 001:  Shoe buckle tongue, brass. 
   3.  22 122 001:  Shoe or knee buckle frame fragment, brass. 
   4.  26 027 001:  Button back, tombac. 
   5.  29 005 001:  Button fragment, tombac. 
   6.  31 041 001:  Shoe or knee buckle frame fragment, brass. 
   7.  31 071 001:  Button remnant, pewter, US type. 
   8.  34 003 001:  Button remnant, pewter, US type. 
   9.  34 050 001:  Button remnant, pewter, US type. 
   10.  40 050 001:  Button, brass. 
   11.  59 011 001:  Shoe or knee buckle frame fragment, brass. 
   12.  70 004 001:  Button, pewter, “USA” pattern. 
   13.  71 004 001:  Shoe buckle, brass, complete. 
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Figure 4.8  Distribution of clothing related artifacts. 










    Figure 4.9: Arms-Related Artifacts 
 
  1.  20 037 001:  Musket trigger guard fragment, iron, French. 
  2.  22 013 001:  Bayonet scabbard frog stud, brass. 
  3.  22 018 001:  Musket turnscrew, US, blade only. 
  4.  22 033 001:  Musket turnscrew made from a wrought spike. 
  5.  22 048 001,002:  Musket band springs, French. 
  6.  22 049 001:  Cartridge box finial, iron. 
  7.  22 078 001:  Powder horn filler cap, brass. 
  8.  22 089 001:  Musket cleaning worm, iron. 
  9.  22 096 001:  Musket pan brush shank, sheet iron. 
  10.  22 105 001:  Gun barrel fragment. 
  11.  22 186 001:  Cartridge box turn latch, iron, US. 
  12.  22 275 001:  Musket flint holder, lead. 
  13.  25 003 001:  Musket side plate fragment, iron, French. 
  14.  30 027 001:  Bayonet scabbard throat and frog stud, iron. 
  15.  30 087 001:  Bayonet scabbard frog stud, brass. 
  16.  31 055 001:  Musket trigger guard fragment, brass, British. 
  17.  33 001 001:  Musket side plate fragment, brass, British. 
  18.  33 002 001:  Musket side plate fragment, brass, British. 
  19.  34 065 001:  Bayonet scabbard tip, brass, British. 
  20.  37 007 001:  Musket flint holder fragment, lead. 
  21.  38 018 001:  Musket barrel shim, lead. 
  22.  39 001 001:  Musket stock pin, brass. 
  23.  47 019 001:  Musket flint holder fragment, lead. 
  24.  51 001 001:  Musket pan brush chain, brass. 
  25.  51 008 001:  Musket trigger guard fragment, iron, French.  
  26.  51 022 001:  Musket nose cap, brass, British. 
  27.  54 013 001:  Bayonet scabbard frog stud, brass. 
  28.  59 005 001:  Musket side plate, brass, British. 
  29.  78 005 001:  Musket trigger guard fragment, brass, British. 
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Figure 4.9  Distribution of arms-related artifacts. 

















    Figure 4.10:  Artillery Artifacts  
 
  1.  01 023 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 56.7g, single sprue. 
  2.  25 001 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 50.5g, double (gang mold) sprue. 
  3.  25 010 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 43.8g, double (gang mold) sprue. 
  4.  26 010 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 42.9g, double (gang mold) sprue. 
  5.  26 037 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 45.1g, double (gang mold) sprue. 
  6.  27 001 001:  Case shot ball, iron,  52.3g, single sprue. 
  7.  29 001 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 64.0g, single sprue. 
  8.  30 167 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 45.9g, double (gang mold) sprue. 
  9.  40 005 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 38.8g (badly pitted), double (gang mold) 
    sprue. 
  10.  73 006 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 54.1g, single sprue. 
  11.  78 001 001:  Case shot ball, iron, 47.4g, single sprue. 
  12.  34 067 001:  Case shot ball, lead, 17.1g, p.d. .575.” 
  13.  30 052 001:  Case shot handle (?), iron wire. 
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Figure 4.10  Distribution of artillery artifacts. 
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cluded in this distribution, as its precise findspot was known, and the particular specimen 
(unusually) was in hand. 
 
 The British artillery fielded two, three-pounders and four, six-pounders, while the 
Americans appear to have employed (and lost) four, six-pounders, two, three-pounders, and 
two, two-pounders.  How many pieces were actually fired during the battle is not known.  In 
addition to the American guns, the British captured “fixed ammunition for six pounders, 160; 
ditto for three pounders, 520…” (Tarleton 1787:139).  This “fixed ammunition” probably in-
cluded both solid shot (cannon ball) cartridges, and canister cartridges, then called “case shot.”3 
Solid shot would have been a very ineffective round on a wooded, short-range battlefield like 
Camden (unless fired at the British in column), and indeed no examples are known to have been 
recovered.  Case shot was probably the only round employed.  A standard British six-pounder 
case shot of the Revolutionary War period consisted of a sheet iron can (or “case”) containing 
56, 1.5 ounce cast iron balls.  The can was attached with copper tacks to a wooden base or sa-
bot, which in turn was secured to a cylindrical flannel powder bag – the whole comprised a 
“fixed” round, or cartridge (Caruana 1979:3).4 The Camden battlefield collections also include 
small numbers of lead case shot balls, which were simply musket balls; these projectiles are 
readily distinguished from balls fired from muskets by the deep scallops and flats that mark 
their surfaces. The SAT survey yielded a single example of a lead case shot ball, and it was an 
unusually small ball at 17.1g, or about .575.”5 
 
 
 Figure 4.11: Distribution of unfired .69 caliber musket balls and cartridges 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of all unfired lead shot that are probably musket balls 
for .69 caliber French muskets.  Broadly speaking, .69 caliber French muskets can be consid-
ered the standard American infantry arm at the Battle of Camden and in the Southern Cam-
paign.  In 1777, large quantities of French muskets began arriving in American ports as covert 
(and later overt) aid to the Revolution.  The French muskets were of many different (but essen-
tially similar) year models, and all were about .69 caliber.  They soon became the regulation 
weapon of the Continental infantry, and they were available in sufficient numbers to be the 
standard infantry weapon (Peterson 1968:36-38; Neumann 2002; Moore 1967:63, 93-99). 
 
 There is also a good chance that the Loyalist militia fighting on the British left at Cam-
den were armed at least partially with captured French muskets.  Lambert (1987:121) indicates 
that there was a serious shortage of British muskets available for issue to Southern loyalists in 
1780.  Although many French muskets were captured by the British when Charleston fell, a 
magazine explosion destroyed an unknown number and possibly the American store of car-
tridges (Borick 2003:303).  Nevertheless, there is ample documentation for the British issue of 
French muskets after the battle of Camden, and it may be that the North Carolina and South 
Carolina Loyalist militia that mustered in support of Cornwallis were thus armed with captured 
muskets (see George Wray papers, William Clements Library, for examples of French Muskets 
being issued to Loyalist militia).   
 
 The diameter range for this group is .630” to .665.”  It appears from field recoveries at 
Camden and elsewhere that a standard ball size of about .635” to .640” was intended (Legg, 
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Smith and Wilson 2005:99, 100, 126-132).6  There were 24 examples of these musket balls re-
covered, in addition to eight specimens that were recovered with buckshot in situ, indicating a 
buck and ball cartridge.  All buck and ball recoveries were from the northern portion of the bat-
tlefield, in areas which were never subjected to intensive agriculture.  Further south, buck and 
ball cartridges are represented by large numbers of unfired buckshot (Figure 4.12), but they are 
not associated with particular musket balls.  Like other larger projectiles on the battlefield, the 
unfired .69 caliber musket balls are strongly underrepresented in our collection simply because 
they have always been relatively easy to detect. 
 
 Figure 4.12: Distribution of unfired buckshot, .250” to .320” in diameter 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of unfired buckshot ranging in diameter from .250” 
to .320,” with the great majority of examples falling between .280” and 310.”7 This is the 
smaller of two diameter ranges encountered on the battlefield, the larger being .320” to .360” in 
diameter (Figure 4.14).  316 examples were recovered, from 277 different locations. 
 
 It is reasonable to assume that these buckshot are from American buck and ball car-
tridges for .69 caliber French muskets.  In October 1777, General Washington ordered that 
“Buckshot are to be put into all cartridges which shall hereafter be made,” although he did not 
specify the quantity (Peterson 1968: 60, 61).  It is clear from artifact evidence, however, that the 
regulation American cartridge included a musket ball and three buckshot of about .300,” the 
buckshot placed in a triangular array on top of the musket ball (Peterson 1968: 60,61; Legg, 
Smith and Wilson 2005:101-103, 126-132).  An unknown but heavy proportion of .69 caliber 
musket cartridges carried into the Battle of Camden included buckshot in addition to the musket 
ball, and buckshot are the most abundant single artifact type from the site.  They provide the 
best indication we have of American fighting positions during the battle.  As mentioned above, 
an unknown number of British Loyalists possibly carried captured French muskets and if so, it 
is reasonable to assume that they might have used captured cartridges, meaning that they too 
fired buck and ball (on the other hand see previous page, Charleston magazine explosion).  This 
might explain a peculiarity in the distribution of fired and unfired “American” buckshot on the 
British left/American right in Figure 4.12.  There, unfired buckshot have been recovered in 
what should be the initial position of the Loyalist militia, while a dense scatter of fired buckshot 
was located behind the American right (Figure 4.18). 
 
 Figure 4.13: Distribution of unfired .75 caliber musket balls  
 
 This figure shows the distribution of all unfired lead shot that are probably musket balls 
for .75 caliber British muskets. Ten examples were recovered from 10 different locations.  Brit-
ish infantry used the .75 caliber, brass-mounted “Long Land Pattern” and “Short Land Pattern” 
flintlock muskets, both improved models of the so-called “Brown Bess” musket introduced in 
the early eighteenth century (Peterson 1968:27-29; Darling 1970; Neumann 2001).  American 
forces used British muskets and American-made copies thereof early in the War, and it is possi-
ble that some militia at Camden were still armed with them.  However, nearly all .75 caliber 
musket balls in Camden Battlefield collections are of a distinctive British type, well made and 
quite spherical, and thoroughly rolled (tumbled) to remove virtually all signs of the sprue scar 
and mold seam.  These have a fairly tight diameter range of about .680” to .695,” with an aver-
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Figure 4.11 Distribution of  unfired .69 caliber musket balls and buck and ball cartridges. 
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Figure 4.13  Distribution of  unfired .75 caliber musket balls.  Red arrow for Chapter 5 interpretation. 
.75 caliber musket balls, unfired. 
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Figure 4.14 Distribution of unfired buckshot .320 to .360 in diameter. 
Large Buckshot, unfired. 
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 age of about .690,” and typical weight is about 30.5 grams.  These are slightly smaller on aver-
age than the large sample of musket balls from “two sites purely British of Revolutionary date” 
measured by Calver and Bolton (1950:80), which yielded a minimum diameter of .687,” and an 
average of .694.” 
 
 The unfired .75 caliber musket balls should be our best indication of the actual British 
unit locations.  Collector #17, for example, reported a rough line of unfired .75 caliber balls 
where we depict the British left in Figure 5.1.  Unfortunately these very large shot are easily 
detected, and very few remained to be recovered archaeologically.  Unlike American cartridges, 
British cartridges generally included no smaller shot that might be diagnostic of the missing 
musket ball, and we are left with very slim evidence for the British fighting positions.8 
 
 Figure 4.14: Distribution of unfired buckshot, .320” to .360” in diameter 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of unfired lead shot ranging in size from .320” 
to .360.”  Forty examples were recovered from 37 different locations. Most of these shot are 
probably buckshot, but a few, very small, rifle or pistol balls may be included.  The function of 
these larger buckshot is problematic.  They are too large to fit a .69 caliber buck and ball car-
tridge - that is, a triangular array of three on top of the musket ball would exceed the diameter 
of the bore.  This suggests that they may be from .75 caliber buck and ball cartridges, either 
British or American, but no such cartridges have been confirmed in any Camden Battlefield col-
lection.  Some examples, at least, are from buckshot cartridges rather than buck and ball car-
tridges; we have documented two unfired loads of mixed buckshot, both of which included balls 
in a range of sizes found together in situ.  An example recovered in Area 59 included eight 
buckshot in six sizes ranging from .285” to .345.” These may represent the personal preference 
of a soldier with either a .69 or a .75 caliber musket.  In any case, the distribution of these larger 
shot is of little diagnostic utility. 
 
 Figure 4.15: Distribution of miscellaneous unfired lead shot 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of a wide variety of unfired lead shot falling in the 
size range of .360” to .630.”  Balls in this range are poorly diagnostic, and a given specimen 
might have been intended for one of several different weapons, military and civilian, including 
rifles, pistols, carbines, fusils, trade guns and fowlers.  Twenty-four examples were recovered 
from 24 locations, and because of their diversity they are individually numbered and identified. 
 
 Several regulation military firearms may be represented among the “miscellaneous” lead 
shot, particularly the largest examples.  Armand’s cavalry were probably armed with French 
carbines, which were .67 caliber weapons that fired a regulation ball of .629” (Neumann and 
Kravic 1975:65; Moller 1993:340-348; Hamilton 1976:130).   British mounted troops carried 
one of several carbine models, all of which were .65 caliber (Moller 1993:256-265; Peterson 
1968:44-45).  These weapons probably fired a ball of about .60.”  There were two models of 
pistols issued to British mounted troops, including a .65 and a .69 caliber pattern (Peterson 
1968:46-48). 
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 The most interesting of the miscellaneous shot are a large group of remarkably crude 
balls that are about .585,” although they are so asymmetrical as to require minimum and maxi-
mum measurements (e.g. .576/.588,” .585/.612”).  These balls were made in very poor molds 
with cavities that were less than hemispherical, and they retain badly trimmed sprue remnants 
and mold seam flash.  They are not the product of some militiaman’s personal mold – they are 
common in Camden battlefield collections, and were clearly mass-produced, widely issued, and 
commonly fired during the battle. It has been suggested that these projectiles were case shot 
balls. Indeed, there is one example (Figure 4.10, #12) recovered during this project that has the 
characteristic scalloping found on fired lead case shot (Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005: Figure 
6.8).  At about 20 grams in weight, they are smaller than the other known lead case shot balls 
from Camden, which weigh about 26 - 28 grams.  However, some unfired examples have car-
tridge powder marks and other fired examples are not scalloped.  It is possible that they were 
made for use as case shot, and were later pressed into service as undersized but usable musket 
balls.   
 
 Figure 4.16: Distribution of all unfired lead shot 
 
 This figure combines the data in Figures 4.11 to 4.15, and includes 417 unfired lead shot 
from 373 different locations.  The deposition of unfired lead shot requires the presence of the 
users at the same location, unlike fired shot, which may be well removed from actual troop lo-
cations.  In that sense, unfired shot data provides more specific information, and logically 
should appear more tightly defined when mapped than fired shot.  In fact, the unfired ammuni-
tion distribution appears as generalized as the fired shot data (below). 
 
 Figure 4.17: Distribution of fired .69 caliber musket balls 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of fired lead shot that are probably from .69 caliber 
French muskets (see Figure 4.11).  A total of 48 examples were recovered from 48 different lo-
cations; like the unfired .69 caliber balls, the fired .69 balls are certainly underrepresented, as 
they have always been easy to detect. 
 
 Figure 4.18: Distribution of fired buckshot, .250” to .320” in diameter 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of smaller fired buckshot, most of which were proba-
bly fired in buck and ball cartridges from .69 caliber French muskets (see Figures 4.11, 4.12).  
A total of 437 examples were recovered from 416 different locations.  Given the collector attri-
tion of .69 caliber musket balls (above), these buckshot provide the best information we have 
regarding the distribution of .69 caliber musket fire, with the understanding that the ball would 
have traveled farther down range than these buckshot. 
 
 Figure 4.19: Distribution of fired .75 caliber musket balls 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of fired lead shot that are probably from .75 caliber 
British muskets (see Figure 4.13).  Like the fired .69 caliber balls, a total of 48 examples were 
recovered from 48 different locations.  Again, these balls are certainly badly underrepresented – 
as the largest lead shot on the field, their numbers have been severely thinned by years of de-










  Figure 4.15:  Distribution of Miscellaneous Unfired Lead Shot 
 
 1.  20 004 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .555,” 16.1g, p.d. .563.” 
 2.  22 050 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .581/.616,” 19.4g, p.d. .599,” very crude mold. 
 3.  22 192 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .580/.600,” 20.1g, p.d. .606,” very crude mold. 
 4.  22 193 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .481,” 9.7g, p.d. .476.” 
 5.  22 321 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .375,” 4.9g, p.d. .379.” 
 6.  25 008 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .542,” 15.2g, p.d. .552.” 
 7.  26 035 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .575,” 17.1g, p.d. .575.” 
 8.  32 013 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .493,” 11.7g, p.d. .506.” 
  9.  33 009 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .545/.604,” 17.4g, p.d. .578,” mold misaligned, 
  rolled. 
 10.  33 020 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .545,” 14.5g, p.d. .544.” 
 11.  34 055 001:  Pewter shot, unfired, .420/.460,” 5.4g, p.d. >.391.”    
 12.  42 004 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .545,” 14.6g, p.d. .545.” 
 13.  42 005 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .554,” 15.0g, p.d. .550.” 
 14.  48 001 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .571/.612,” 20.3g, p.d. .608,” very crude mold.  
  15.  50 016 001:  Lead shot, unfired, 18.7g, p.d. >.592,” very crude mold, heavy powder        
  corrosion.  
 16.  50 020 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .568/.612,” 17.8g, p.d. .582,” very crude mold. 
 17.  51 003 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .612,” 21.3g, p.d. .618.” 
 18.  51 005 001:  Lead shot, unfired (?), 15.8g, p.d. >.560, heavy road abrasion. 
 19.  51 007 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .560,” 16.5g, p.d. .568.” 
 20.  52 001 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .566/.601,” 17.8g, p.d. .582,” very crude mold. 
 21.  52 002 001:  Lead shot, unfired, as 52 001 001 but substantially melted. 
 22.  54 001 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .588/.628,” 21.4g, p.d. .619,” very crude mold. 
 23.  71 002 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .580/.619,” 21.1g, p.d. .616,” very crude mold. 
 24.  73 003 001:  Lead shot, unfired, .588/.601,” 20.7g, p.d. .612,” very crude mold. 
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Figure 4.15  Distribution of miscellaneous unfired lead shot. 
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Figure 4.16  Distribution of all unfired lead shot.  Red arrows for Chapter 5 interpretations. 
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Figure 4.17  Distribution of fired .69 caliber musket balls.  Red arrow for Chapter 5 interpretations. 
.69 caliber musket balls, fired. 
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Figure 4.18  Distribution of fired buckshot, .250” to .320.”  Red Arrow for Chapter 5 interpretations. 
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 tecting, leaving scant evidence for the distribution of British fire. 
 
 Figure 4.20: Distribution of fired buckshot, .320” to .360” in diameter 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of larger fired buckshot of uncertain function (see 
Figure 4.14).  A total of 24 examples were recovered from 24 different locations.  Like the un-
fired examples, the distribution of the fired specimens is not helpful in suggesting what weapon 
or weapons employed these shot. 
 
 Figure 4.21: Distribution of miscellaneous lead shot, fired 
 
 This figure shows the distribution of fired lead shot of miscellaneous sizes be-
tween .360” and .630,” and certain other fired examples including torn fragments of fired balls.  
A total of 32 examples were recovered from 32 different locations, and because of their diver-
sity they are individually numbered and identified.  Most of these shot are as poorly diagnostic 
as the corresponding unfired specimens (Figure 4.15), but in a few cases firing has imparted 
additional clues.  These include three buckshot specimens clearly fired in buckshot loads rather 
than in buck and ball loads, one of which was fired in a rifled barrel.  Four, fired rifle balls were 
identified – none of these, of course, would have been identifiable as such if unfired.  Rifle balls 
are rare in private collections from Camden.  There were no units of riflemen in the Battle of 
Camden, although there may have been a few rifles among the militia on either side.  The oc-
currence of rifle balls is so rare that the few examples recovered may actually represent civilian 
hunting before or after the battle, in any case the use of rifles in the Battle of Camden was insig-
nificant. 
 
 Figure 4.22: Distribution of all fired lead shot 
 
 This figure combines the data from Figures 4.17 to 4.21, and includes 589 fired lead 
shot from 568 different locations. 
 
 Figure 4.23: Distribution of all battle artifacts 
 
 This figure combines the data from Figures 4.8 to 4.22, together with previously un-
mapped occurrences of melted lead (80 specimens),9 melted pewter (3), and “other” ammuni-
tion (13), including cut fragments and other specimens that could not be classed as either fired 
or unfired.  A total of 1,165 artifacts from 1,099 different locations are shown on Figure 4.23.10 
 
Summary of Data Presented 
 
 When it became clear that the SAT metal detecting project was yielding a large amount 
of battle data, we looked forward to the insights we might derive from mapping various classes 
and combinations of material.  In spite of a subjective impression in the field that the distribu-
tions were generalized, we anticipated that various subsets of artifacts would map differentially, 
suggesting positions and movements during the battle.  The figures preceding Figure 4.23 pre-
sent the results of such distribution mapping.  The patterns revealed are not as clear as hoped, 
and the various subsets co-occur to a remarkable degree.  In the end, Figure 4.23 is by far the  










Figure 4.20 Distribution of fired .320” to .360” buckshot. 








  Figure 4.21:  Distribution of Miscellaneous Fired Lead Shot. 
 
 1.  20 007 001:  Lead shot, fired, 16.9g, p.d. .572.” 
 2.  20 015 001:  Lead shot, fired, 9.4g, p.d. .471,” with probable rifling marks. 
 3.  20 017 001:  Lead shot, fired, 18.0g, p.d. .584.” 
 4.  22 003 001:  Lead shot, fired, 19.7g, p.d. .602.” 
 5.  22 063 001:  Lead shot fragment, 5.3g, portion of a torn ball. 
 6.  22 134 001:  Lead shot, fired, 22.1g, p.d. .626.” 
 7.  22 179 001:  Lead shot, fired, 10.4g, p.d. .487.” 
 8.  22 244 001:  Lead shot fragment, 5.2g, portion of a torn ball. 
 9.  22 260 001:  Lead shot, fired, 19.8g, p.d. .603.” 
 10.  27 002 001:  Lead shot, fired, 18.7g, p.d. .592.” 
 11.  28 004 001:  Lead shot, fired, 11.7g, p.d. .506.” 
 12.  30 003 001:  Lead shot, fired, 21.0g, p.d. .615.” 
 13.  30 009 001:  Lead shot, fired, 18.0g, p.d. .584.” 
 14.  30 016 001:  Lead shot, fired, 15.3g, p.d. .554.” 
 15.  30 034 001:  Lead shot, fired, 2.5g, p.d. .302,” fired as buckshot from a rifle. 
 16.  30 046 001:  Lead shot fragment, 0.9g, portion of a torn ball. 
 17.  30 063 001:  Lead shot, fired, 21.9g, p.d. .624,” with three buck and ball dents. 
 18.  30 097 001:  Lead shot, fired, 2.5g, p.d. .302,” fired as buckshot. 
 19.  31 043 001:  Lead shot, fired, 22.4g, p.d. .629.” 
 20.  33 004 001:  Lead shot, fired, 18.0g, p.d. .584.” 
 21.  34 024 001:  Lead shot, fired, 17.4g, p.d. .578.” 
 22.  34 033 001:  Lead shot, fired, 18.6g, partially melted, p.d. >.591.” 
 23.  39 003 001:  Lead shot fragment, 8.5g, portion of a torn ball. 
 24.  39 013 001:  Lead shot, fired, 20.6g, p.d. .611,” with rifling marks. 
 25.  39 014 001:  Lead shot, fired, 14.0g, p.d. .537.” 
 26.  40 053 001:  Lead shot, fired, 16.1g, p.d. .563.” 
 27.  40 054 001:  Lead shot, fired, 5.7g, p.d. .398.” 
 28.  40 060 001:  Lead shot, fired, 20.0g, p.d. .605,” very crude mold. 
 29.  45 010 001:  Lead shot, fired, 5.5g, p.d. .393,” with rifling marks. 
 30.  47 030 001:  Lead shot, fired, 22.1g, p.d. .626.” 
 31.  50 001 001:  Lead shot, fired, 17.0g, p.d. .573,” very crude mold. 
 32.  51 010 001:  Lead shot, fired, 3.6g, p.d. .342,” with rifling marks. 
 33.  59 007 001:  Lead shot fragment, 1.8g, portion of a torn ball. 
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Figure 4.21 Distribution of miscellaneous fired lead shot. 
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Figure 4.22  Distribution of all fired lead shot.  Red arrow for Chapter 5 interpretations. 
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Figure 4.23  Distribution of all battle artifacts. 
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most useful result of our efforts, and it shows, essentially, the location of the heaviest action in 
the Battle of Camden.   
 
 We suggest two major causes for the very generalized distribution of the artifacts.  First, 
the very fluid and confused nature of the battle precludes distributions that clearly define the 
fighting positions of the two armies; participant testimony (Chapter 2) makes it clear that both 
east and west of the road, both sides must have fought from, and moved through, several posi-
tions; at least two advances and withdraws by the 1st Maryland Brigade and maybe more by the 
2nd Maryland.  Secondly, we are dealing with only a vestige of the original artifact depositions, 
those objects left behind after decades of private collecting.  While 1,165 artifacts can certainly 
locate the battle with considerable clarity, 20,000 artifacts from the same search areas might 
have shed somewhat more light on the subject.  If, for example, we could map all of the un-
fired .69 and .75 caliber musket balls present in 1950, some distinctions would probably have 
emerged. 
 
 Nevertheless, Chapter 5 attempts to tease out some patterns from the data presented in 
this chapter, and combined with our previous efforts and the collector data, presents what we 
believe is a reasonable argument for the flow of the battle in four phases. 
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of metal detecting on non-architectural military sites, together with the futility of certain traditional methods such 
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23(1), pp. 39-67; Douglas D. Scott, “Oral Tradition and Archaeology: Conflict and Concordance from Two Indian 
War Sites,” Historical Archaeology, 2003, 37(3), pp.55-65.   
2With very rare exceptions, small arms ammunition was spherical until practical elongated designs began to 
emerge in the 2nd quarter of the 19th century.  The Crimean War (1854-56) was the first conflict featuring  distinc-
tive bullet patterns fielded by the several belligerents. 
3By the time of the American Civil War, the term “case shot” was applied to explosive shells containing musket 
balls for anti-personnel use; still later, such projectiles were called “shrapnel shells.”  Case shot is distinct from 
grape shot, which consisted of larger iron balls bolted together in a stack, or secured in a bound (“quilted”) cloth 
cover. Grape shot was normally a naval ammunition but was used on land (Caruana 1979.:2). 
4Here is another possible source for the tacks found on the Camden Battlefield (Legg, Smith and Wilson 
2005:108). 
5These lead canister balls were not recognized as such by the collectors in our survey, and none were individually 
plotted.  At least four examples, however, came from the south end of the battlefield, east of State Route 58, where 
they were probably fired at the British right.   Sivilich (2004:16,17) reported American musket ball canister from 
the Monmouth Battlefield. An excavated six-pounder musket ball round of unknown provenience is illustrated in 
Neumann and Kravic (1997:10 Fig.4).  Most of the lead case shot analyzed in private Camden collections were 26 
to 28g (.661” to .680”), a size rather too large for a French musket and small for a British musket – these may have 
been ill-suited musket balls relegated to use as case shot.  One 27.1g example found by Collector #17 had a very 
clear and undistorted barrel mark indicating that it was probably fired in a 6-pounder gun. 
6Hamilton (1976:130) records that the French regulation ball for the .69 caliber musket in the 18th century 
was .652” in diameter, which is somewhat larger than most balls recovered from American contexts. The new 
United States settled on a regulation ball of .640,” and it remained standard until the Civil War, while the French 
reduced their standard .69 caliber ball to .629” in 1800 (Thomas 1997:100;Hamilton 1976:130). 
7A sample of 1,028 Camden buckshot measured by Henderson (n.d.:2) found 913 examples within the 
range .2812” to .3125,” with 12 smaller and 103 larger. 
8There is currently some controversy regarding the British use of “buck and ball” during the war.  There is no evi-
dence that any fired or unfired .75 caliber musket balls from the Camden battlefield were in cartridges with buck-
shot and there is strong evidence from elsewhere that at least British regulars did not normally use “buck and ball.”  
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For instance, a collection from the British camp of 16 and 17 August, 1780, on the south side of Granny Quarter 
Creek included a large quantity of unfired British musket balls, with no buckshot in association (Joe Henderson, 
personal communication, 2004).  A collection of .75 caliber lead shot metal detected by Legg from the British 
camp at Fort Fairlawn did not include buckshot.   Yet, Larry Babits (personal communication 2004, 2008) notes 
that the British did adopt buck and ball after Camden, based on numerous pension accounts from veterans of the 
Cowpens, Guilford Court House, Hobkirk’s Hill, Ninety-Six and Eutaw Springs battles.  The discrepancy may be 
due to the use of captured French muskets by Loyalist units, or personal preference, but as of yet we have no evi-
dence of the British regulars using such cartridges.  If they did adopt the practice on the American front, they must 
have abandoned it when they returned to Europe. Buck and ball is also unknown on European battlefields of the 
Seven Years War, the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars (Brad Posey, personal communica-
tion, 2004).  
9The only  melted lead specimens considered battle artifacts were those with heavy lead patina comparable to that 
seen on lead shot from the Battle of Camden. 
10“Miscellaneous” class artifacts are not included.  This group includes a wide variety of mostly iron artifacts of 
uncertain origin, including iron buckles, horse shoes and horse shoe fragments, bit parts, eating utensils, unidenti-
fied wrought iron implements and hardware, wrought nails and spikes, etc.  Probably most of these objects are bat-
tle artifacts, but their ambiguity excludes them from Figure 4.23. 
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 Previous research using relic collector interviews, historic research, and a small scale 
metal detecting survey, resulted in a proposed battle scenario consisting of four phases (Legg, 
Smith and Wilson 2005).  That study also projected hypothesized locations of the main Ameri-
can and British units for each phase onto a modern 7.5 minute U.S.G.S. Topographic map.  As 
stated at the time, “this is not the last word on the Battle of Camden, but this scenario is offered 
as a ‘line of departure’ for future debate” (Legg, Smith and Wilson 2005:61).  The present pro-
ject has provided abundant additional archaeological information to further refine our original 
interpretation. 
 
 The incorporation of our systematic controlled metal detecting survey with the previous 
analysis provides powerful, physical, and conclusive proof of the location of the general battle 
events that unfolded on August 16th, 1780, including the anchoring of the initial battle lines, lo-
cation of the struggle between De Kalb and the British left, the advance and retreat of the 1st 
Maryland Brigade, and the likely routes of escape.  Our conclusion is that our initial analysis of 
the unfolding of the battle from the Collector Survey was largely correct.  The archaeological 
data from this project not only supports that analysis but also provides additional precision, and 
offers intriguing, but admittedly less conclusive, evidence of specific moments in the battle.  
This precision has been enhanced by placing the archaeological finds on the two-foot contour 
map funded by PCF.  This chapter serves to present and discuss the unfolding of the Battle of 
Camden based on all of the evidence from the collector’s survey and the archaeological investi-
gations. 
 
Camden battlefield Archaeological Coverage 
 
 Ideally, we would have liked complete 100% coverage.  Nevertheless, the 78 areas and 
firebreaks covered confirm an intense battle from a broad, 400 meter long, east-west line about 
300 meters south of the DAR park southern boundary, turning north and continuing up to the 
northern boundary of the DAR park, and running along the east side of the road (Figure 3.1). 
This area of intense combat is shaped somewhat like a fish-hook, with the hook facing west.  
Surrounding this is a less dense, but still impressive scatter of battle related artifacts surround-
ing this shape to the northwest and south (Figure 4.23).  From the combined data, there is sim-
ply no other conclusion that can be drawn except that the most intensive combat occurred in the 
areas depicted on Figures 3.1 and 4.23.  Admittedly, our archaeological survey did not inten-
sively cover the battlefield east and southeast of the DAR park.  However, sampling (firebreaks 
43, 44, 41, 48, and area 53), did not recover large quantities of artifacts in this area.  Doubtless, 
there are materials immediately east of firebreaks 40 and 50, or areas 54 and 50, however, this 
zone was not burned and consists of young planted pines.  Coverage with a metal detector at 
this time would not have produced much evidence given the conditions and awaits a future con-
trolled burn.  In any case, our evidence suggests that not much would have been or will be 
found there if future opportunities become available. 
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 Likewise, we would have liked to have had the time to increase our coverage of the 
broad hill and slope northwest of the DAR park.  Again, sampling of areas 56, 70, 72, 57, 71, 
and firebreaks 42 and 45, indicate exactly what was expected; evidence of battle, but not the 
density seen in the DAR park and along the road south of the park.  Still another gap is immedi-
ately southwest of the DAR park.  This area unfortunately has been damaged by heavy equip-
ment, and is still in briars and young pine.  The likelihood of obtaining good data here is not 
promising.  Nevertheless, firebreak 38 and area 35 indicate that the battle continued there, 
though not as intense as in the DAR park and to the south.  Note the lack of artifacts along the 
northern end of firebreaks 38 and 47, and southern end of firebreak 45 (Figures 4.2, 4.23).  Fi-
nally, the controlled burn did not include a zone 500 to 600 meters northwest of the DAR park.  
Again, this area is in young pine and nearly impossible to search systematically.  Our inclusion 
of this area as a concentration of artifacts is based solely on collector interviews. 
 
 Overall, while the distribution of various types of ammunition and accoutrements across 
the battlefield is not as clear as we would like, there are important interpretations that can be 
drawn by the combined archaeological data presented on the various archaeological and collec-




 In Legg, Smith, and Wilson 2005, we did not offer a specific hypothesis regarding the 
night battle but implied that it probably occurred south of our proposed initial British deploy-
ment line (2005:73-74) (Figure 5.1).  We are now convinced that this skirmish occurred within 
and south of the initial British deployment (Figure 5.1).  There are sufficient numbers of battle 
related artifacts (Figure 4.23) to indicate a skirmish there.  There are very few ammunition arti-
facts found in areas 27, 78, and the southern ends of 50 and 23.  Collectors have indicated they 
found lead shot south of the PCF boundary line, even in the deep draw south of the line (Figure 
5.1).  Furthermore, collectors have indicated that there was a Continental soldier burial near the 
PCF line (Smith, Legg, and Leader 2009).  We do not believe that this soldier would have been 
dragged to that location; rather it is more likely he was buried where he was killed and therefore 
is likely to have been killed in the night battle. 
 
 Figure 4.12 arrow 1, 4.16, arrow 1 shows an interesting east-west line of unfired buck-
shot and other shot in areas 33 and 50.  Also, there are two fired .75 caliber balls along the same 
line of the unfired shot (Figure 4.19, arrow 1).  These distributions may indicate the initial de-
ployment line of the American front at night (unfired buckshot and fired .75s), with subsequent 
withdrawal and occupation by the British.  We may also be pressing the data too hard, but it is 




  As noted, we are firmly convinced that the initial British and American lines as pro-
jected on the two foot contour map are accurate (Figure 5.1).  This map depicts the deployment 
of both forces about the time Captain Singleton of the American artillery sees the British  
Chapter Five           89 
Figure 5.1  Phase I:  Initial deployment of opposing forces, battle of Camden. 
Americans in Blue: 
1-1st Maryland Brigade 





British in Red: 
7-North Carolina Militia 
8-Volunteer Militia 
9-British Legion Infantry 
10-Volunteers of Ireland 
11-33rd Regiment of Foot 
12-23rd Regiment of Foot 
13-Light Infantry 
14, 15 71st Battalions 
16-British Legion Cavalry 
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Figure 5.2  Phase II:  Collapse of the American militia, engagement of Continentals and British.  
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maneuvering to the right and opens fire, but before Colonel Otho Williams orders the American 
militia forward.  At this moment, the British right is actually still adjusting their lines eastward 
to cover the American line, which is already stretched to the eastern slope of the plateau. 
 
 On the British left, Provincials are deployed south of a swampy ravine, or as Stewart 
noted “the Provincials were on the left, with the marshy ground in their front” (Stewart 
1977:67).  The Faden and Landers maps support this placement (Figures 2.3 and 2.4) and this 
helps to anchor the British line from that point along the line to the right (eastern) flank.   
 
Phase II  
 
 Figure 5.2 depicts a moment in the battle when the American left, the Virginia and 
North Carolina militia, has totally collapsed and is rapidly fleeing north up the main road; some 
undoubtedly heading off the road to the northeast.  On the American right flank, De Kalb’s 
Delaware and Maryland Continentals have advanced and pushed back the British left, and are 
engaged in close combat, while Dickson’s North Carolina militia are holding desperately 
against the British 33rd. 
 
 Behind Dickson’s militia and to the northeast, but south of the DAR park, the 1st Mary-
land Brigade has advanced to fill the line vacated by the routed militia.  The British 23rd Regi-
ment, following the militia, have slammed up against the 1st Maryland Brigade’s advance and 
are attempting to turn the American left flank.  A gap is forming between the two Continental 
commands. 
 
 There is no irrefutable archaeological evidence for these positions, however, there are 
three clusters of unfired buckshot that hint at battle episodes.  First, there is a cluster of unfired 
buckshot of the size assumed to be from an American cartridge (Figure 4.12, arrow 2), at the 
projected location of the American artillery and Dickson’s North Carolina militia.  Second, 
there is another cluster of fired and unfired buckshot west of this location, at and behind, the 
American right (Figures 4.12, 4.18).  Here is where we believe Gist’s 2nd Maryland and the 
British Provincials, both using French muskets, engaged in intense combat.  Finally, there is 
another large cluster of unfired buckshot (Figure 4.12, arrow 3) south of the DAR park where 
we have projected the combat between the 1st Maryland Brigade and the 23rd Regiment in Fig-
ure 5.2.  We interpret this as the Marylanders slowly retreating under pressure from the 23rd.  
Our assemblage of fired .69 (French) and .75 (British) lead shot are not sufficient for much in-
terpretation, but we do note a slight cluster of .75 fired shot (southern part of the DAR park) 
north of the unfired buckshot cluster (Figure 4.19, arrow 2).  Perhaps this indicates over-shots 
by the British during this episode.  In any case, the clusters of ammunition discussed above can 
be seen on the map of all fired lead shot, although less distinct (Figure 4.22).  It is also interest-
ing to point out the lack of .75 caliber (British) musket balls east of the road south of the DAR 
park (Figure 4.19).  This is certainly partially due to collector activity, but is also evidence that 
the British right charged with bayonets and did not meet American resistance along their right 
flank until they were parallel with the American left, in other words, not until they clashed with 
the 1st Maryland Brigade. 
 
 




 This phase continues the intensive combat between DeKalb’s Continentals and the Brit-
ish Provincials with the 33rd on their right, while to the north, a back and forth battle between 
the 1st Maryland Brigade and 23rd has moved north into what is now the DAR park (Figure 5.3).  
The two battalions of the 71st have been committed and reinforce each wing of the British army.  
Essentially, there are two battles occurring with a widening gap between the two.  Again, the 
archaeological data are not as clear as we would like, but the distribution of unfired buckshot, 
unfired shot and fired shot all imply clustering described previously with the addition of cluster-
ing in the DAR park (Figures 4.12, 4.15, 4.16, 4.22, and 4.23).  Whatever happened, it is clear 
that there is a decrease in the density of lead shot in the southern portion of the DAR park, be-
tween two dense clusters of unfired and fired lead shot, one in area 30 and the other in the DAR 
park (see for instance, Figure 4.22, arrow).  The map of unfired buckshot, Figure 4.12, may de-
pict two ‘stands’ by the 1st Maryland Brigade.  The first of these was described in Phase II (see 
above).  The second is a line of unfired buckshot (Figure 4.12, arrow 4) extending across the 
DAR park just south of the DeKalb monument (not shown), northeast to the edge of the park.  
Is it possible this is evidence of the Marylanders’ line?  The distribution of unfired .69 caliber 
shot and cartridges also forms a line consistent with this unfired buckshot (Figure 4.11, arrow).  
This is somewhat further supported by fired .75 balls behind and to the west of this line (Figure 
4.19, arrow 3), perhaps representing the 23rd’s fire through the 1st Maryland Brigade.   
 
Phase IV   
 
 Figure 5.4 depicts the beginning of the final phase of the main battle, the rout of all 
American units.  De Kalb’s command is broken up and retreats westward.  The Provincials and 
33rd have not yet moved west, but the 23rd and 71st have broken the 1st Maryland Brigade and 
are following them west and north.  Some of De Kalb’s command has been pushed over the hill 
and into a deep depression.  There is a concentration of fired and unfired ammunition along fire 
break 47 in this topographic depression (Figures 4.22 and 4.23).  A metal detecting reconnais-
sance of the upland between fire break 47 and 38 indicates a strong likelihood of artifact con-
centrations.  The area is now covered in young pines not suitable for a systematic. But a quick 
sweep recovered numerous buckshot, which were returned to the ground for the future.  Some-
time between Phases III and IV, Tarleton’s cavalry went forward in two columns, one attacking 
the 1st Maryland Brigade and the other getting in behind De Kalb’s remnants.  Their exact route 
is not known, but it is likely that they stayed on the plateau and did not venture far from the 
main road.  Tarleton continued up the road to harass the militia stragglers and will meet rem-
nants of Armand’s cavalry at Rugeley’s Mill.  Also, at least a few American Continentals must 
have followed the militia by running to the northeast as unfired buckshot and one fired .75 
(British) lead ball found along firebreaks 43 and 48 provide tentative evidence that some 
Americans were followed by the British into that area.  We speculate that this occurred at the 
end of the fighting, since the British were not likely to have been in this area until after the 1st 
Maryland Brigade collapsed. 
 
 In our initial interpretation, collector finds along the broad hill slope to the northwest of 
the DAR park were seen as the location where American Continentals retreated and some sur-
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Figure 5.3  Phase III:  The battle breaks into two engagements, 71st reinforces British flanks. 
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Figure 5.4  Phase IV:  Tarleton’s cavalry committed, all American units routed. 
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rendered.  The distribution of all fired and unfired shot (Figures 4.16 and 4.22, 4.23) supports 
this scenario.  There are comparatively few artifacts there (areas 57, 70, 71, 72, 76 and fire-
breaks 42 and 45).  The complete lack of .69 caliber musket balls (Figure 4.17), nearly com-
plete lack of fired buckshot (Figure 4.18), combined with a scatter of unfired ball and buckshot 
(Figures 4.11 and 4.12) implies that the American Continentals were on the run, and being 
chased primarily by British regulars.  These distributions provide overwhelming evidence that 
this part of the battlefield was not the scene of intense, face to face combat.  Instead, it points to 
an American flight, surrender, and slaughter.  More than likely, the chase and capture were car-
ried out by the 33rd, 71st, and perhaps Tarleton.  The British Provincials were still engaged 
with remnants of DeKalb’s Continentals west of the initial lines in the depression, and did not 
venture up the hill slope north and west of the DAR park. 
 
Collector Data and Archaeological Data Compared 
 
 As noted, no conclusions from the archaeological data contradict those drawn from the 
original study (Legg, Smith, and Wilson 2005); instead the archaeological data enhances and 
provides greater precision to those earlier conclusions.  Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 depict the col-
lector survey data for weapons and accoutrements, clothing, and case shot onto the two-foot 
contour map.  It is important to emphasize that these projections are our interpretations of 
where different collectors told us they found artifacts.  They do not represent the exact location 
of a particular artifact, rather they represent general distributions and general provenience.   
 
 Our meager archaeological collection of case shot is consistent with, but does not neces-
sarily overlap that found and remembered by collectors (Figures 4.5, 5.5).  Our case shot assem-
blage appears to primarily represent British fire at the American lines (except two located in 
areas 78 and 27), while the collector’s survey represents American fire at the British (Figure 
4.10).  Collectors found considerable numbers of case shot at and just south of the initial 
American line.  We found very little, and this is disappointing, but not unexpected given the 
amount of relic collecting (see below).  It also appears from both collections that the British 
moved their cannon up the road to fire at the 1st Maryland Brigade during the battle. 
 
 Another cluster of artifacts revealed by the relic collector survey, but not seen in the ar-
chaeological data is the cluster of clothing, weapons and accoutrements collectors found on the 
broad hill slope northwest of the DAR park (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).  Our archaeological survey 
recovered one USA button, a complete shoe buckle, four full .69 cartridges (figure 4.11) and no 
weapons and accoutrements in the sample areas and firebreaks here.  Several collectors report 
this area was rich in clothing, weapons, and accoutrement artifacts.  We can only assume that 
these artifacts have been recovered from the site prior to our work.  In either case, our interpre-
tation for this area does not change; this was the location of Americans in flight without organ-
ized resistance.  Or, as Dr. Larry Babits suggests, the clothing artifacts at this location represent 
the surrender of Continentals having been cut off from retreat.  This also makes sense. 
 
 North of the hill slope, just above a depression and just west of the wide ridge line, col-
lectors have indicated that at least three burials and a dense array of artifacts were found (Smith, 
Legg, and Leader 2009).  This location is currently unsearchable, consisting of small, young 
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pines and thick briars.  We believe that the depression has significant materials and represents a 
‘last stand’ of some Continental soldiers, hence the red dense area shown on Figure 3.1. 
 
Effects of Relic Collecting 
 
 It should be noted that the reason archaeological data primarily serves to supplement 
and enhance collectors’ data is a result of the prolonged and intensive relic hunting that oc-
curred prior to the archaeology.  It is clear that despite years of relic collecting, there still re-
mains substantial artifact material.  It is also clear that most ‘high grade’ large artifacts have 
been removed. Despite the advantage of controlled burning, systematic controlled coverage, 
and in most cases double or repeated coverage of specific survey areas, the archaeological sur-
vey failed to recover sufficient numbers of large artifacts for the kinds of precise analysis that 
archaeology can usually afford.  The number of case shot, .69 caliber and .75 caliber balls, 
weapon parts, and buttons were insufficient for clear analysis (Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8, 
4.12, and 4.14).  Only by combining ammunition distributions do tentative patterns appear.  
Meanwhile, buckshot was found in tremendous quantities and allowed both micro and macro 
analysis, again in combination with other ammunition distributions.  Clearly, this phenomena is 
the result of past relic collecting.  Large objects were desirable and taken, the smaller, less de-
sirable objects, like buckshot, were missed.  The result is the frustrating two edged sword of 
battlefield archaeology.  We were most fortunate that collectors allowed access to their collec-
tions and generously cooperated with our study by going over maps and revisiting the site.  At 
the same time, their removal of large diagnostic artifacts destroyed the best evidence of battle-
field maneuvers.  Overall, the archaeology has been well worth the effort in providing a collec-
tion of battle artifacts for the public trust, providing solid, irrefutable physical evidence of the 
main flow of the battle, and in revealing tantalizing clues to some specific moments.  We re-
main realistically committed to salvaging archaeological data through future collector inter-
views and surveys and all the benefits that these efforts can provide toward understanding the 
past, while lamenting what might have been. 
 
Final Thoughts and Recommendations 
 
 Despite our regret that the archaeology is thirty years late, the combined collector’s and 
archaeological survey funded by PCF and the National Park Service has been an unprecedented 
opportunity to study a Revolutionary War battle and has provided an amazing array of artifac-
tual and archaeological data for future research.  We are very humbled to have been given the 
opportunity to conduct these surveys.  We are also very appreciative of the efforts of PCF to 
place this battlefield within the public trust.  It should be noted that this particular project has 
been fieldwork heavy and analysis light in terms of time and effort. The unique opportunity to 
cover much larger areas of the battlefield than originally planned in our research design was a 
result of the controlled burn and was a temptation impossible to resist. We did not know then 
and do not know now if we will ever get another opportunity to cover so much territory.  It 
seemed reasonable at the time and still does today, to have expended most of the project time in 
the field collecting data.  Now that it is collected, the data will be available for future research-
ers to glean additional insights into the battle of Camden. With this in mind, we offer some final 
recommendations for future work. 
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 The entire artifact collection could be evaluated in greater detail and additional maps 
generated which might add to the battle interpretation.  Our primary effort was to identify ob-
jects in basic terms. More work should be done in the future. 
 
 Of course, we would like to see additional fieldwork. This should be arranged as future 
controlled burns are planned and executed.  Systematic metal detecting east of areas 54 and 50, 
even a few samples, would provide negative evidence to further anchor the extent of the battle 
lines.  In other words, we would expect to find few artifacts there, but conducting the work 
would provide further proof of the battle’s main combat locations. 
 
 The hill side west and north of area 34 leading to the depression where we found a large 
number of buckshot (firebreak 47) is likely to contain significant amounts of battle artifacts.  
We are convinced this is the immediate escape route of the right flank of the American army. 
 
 Sampling of the hill slope across the DAR park to the west and northwest is important, 
again for its expected negative evidence which, anchors the main battlefield to the east and 
south. 
 
 The ridge in the extreme northwestern portion of the battlefield should be covered some 
day in the future.  Collectors have found a number of important artifacts there, including burials 
and it must be searched (Smith, Legg, and Leader 2009).  It would appear that there was a stand 
by some Americans at that location.  This work will have to wait thinning and a controlled burn, 
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Appendix I:  The Catalog/Provenience System.  
 
 
The number assigned to each object includes three elements, and  appears thus:  
00-000-000.  The elements include: 
 
Collection Code:  the initial two digits. 
 
The Collection Code has been assigned as follows: 
 
01  Anonymous Collector 1. 
02  Anonymous Collector 2. 
03  Joe Henderson. 
04  Bruce Meyer. 
05  Calvin Keys. 
06  Merle McGee (not recorded, deceased). 
07  Ken Hamilton. 
08  Arnold Stone. 
09  Steve Mahoney. 
10  Ray Hunt. 
11  Don Knight. 
12  Anonymous Collector 3 (not recorded). 
13  William C. Major. 
14  Dale Williams. 
15  Cantey Haile. 
16  Anonymous Collector 4. 
17  Anonymous Collector 5. 
18  Anonymous Collector 6 (not recorded). 
19  Number not used. 
20  1998 metal detector collection area. 
21  Reserved for artifacts found during the 2001-2004 project, outside of any metal 
detector collection area. 
22  2004 metal detector collection area (former DAR property). 
23  2004 metal detector collection area. 
24  2004 metal detector collection area. 
25  2004 metal detector collection area. 
26  2004 metal detector collection area. 
27  2004 metal detector collection area. 
28  2004 metal detector collection area. 
29  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
30  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
31  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
32  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
33  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
34  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
35  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
   II
 
36  Reserved for artifacts found during the 2005-2007 project, outside of any metal 
detector collection area. 
37  2005-2006 metal detector collection area. 
38  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
39  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
40  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
41  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
42  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
43  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
44  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
45  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
46  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
47  2007 fire break metal detector collection. 
48  2007 metal detector collection area. 
49  2007 metal detector collection area. 
50  2007 metal detector collection area. 
51  2007 metal detector collection area. 
52  2007 metal detector collection area. 
53  2007 metal detector collection area. 
54  2007 metal detector collection area. 
55  2007 metal detector collection area. 
56  2007 metal detector collection area (negative). 
57  2007 metal detector collection area. 
58  Number not used. 
59  2007 metal detector collection area. 
60  Burial #1. 
61  Reserved for Burial #2. 
62  Burial #3. 
63  Reserved for Burial #4. 
64  Reserved for Burial #5. 
65  Reserved for Burial #6. 
66  Reserved for Burial #7. 
67  Reserved for Burial #8. 
68  Number not used. 
69  Number not used. 
70  2007 metal detector collection area. 
71  2007 metal detector collection area. 
72  2007 metal detector collection area. 
73  2007 metal detector collection area. 
74  2007 metal detector collection area. 
75  2007 metal detector collection area. 
76  2007 metal detector collection area. 
77  2007 metal detector collection area. 
78  2007 metal detector collection area. 
 
   III
   
Provenience Code:  the middle three digits. 
 
The provenience code signifies an artifact GPS coordinate or a described location within 
a particular collection. 
 
 
Item Code:  the final three digits. 
 
The item code numbers multiple objects within the same provenience. 
 
 
A Functional Class Code is also assigned to each artifact to facilitate topical map layers.  
The codes assigned include: 
 
S   Lead shot, including musket balls, buckshot, etc. 
A  Arms and accoutrements artifacts, excluding ammunition. 
C  Clothing artifacts. 
G  Iron and lead case shot (canister) balls. 
M  Miscellaneous artifacts, possibly or probably from the battle. 
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